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PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

2 by Vasu Gounden

FEATURES



3 **The Role of the Private Security Industry in Africa's Peacekeeping Missions**

by Sabelo Gumedze

9 **The Role of AFRICOM: Observer, Enforcer or Facilitator of Peace?**

by Gerrie Swart



16 **Civilian Protection in African Peacekeeping: A Gender Perspective**

by Onwuka Onyinye Nkechi

23 **Post-Conflict Reintegration Challenges in Sierra Leone**

by Zinurine Abiodu Alghali

FACT-FILE

30 **Sudan Fact-File**

by Walter Lotze

FEATURES



35 **US Involvement in African Peacekeeping**

by Kenneth Mpyisi

41 **MONUC and Post-Electoral Challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

by Gustavo de Carvalho

48 **Strategic Planning and Local Ownership as Critical Factors in the Coherence and Coordination of Peacebuilding Systems**

by Cedric de Coning



BOOK REVIEW

55 **Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations**

by Geoff Harris



EDITORIAL

BY **VASU GOUNDEN**

Africa continues to take centre stage in the global peace operations arena. The international community, adopting a comprehensive strategy, has persevered in its efforts to contain conflicts as well as support and guide countries as they embark upon the fragile, and often-times complex, trajectory to sustainable peace, underpinned inter alia by revitalised economies and strengthened national institutions.

In this endeavour, there exists today a more ready response from a broad spectrum of actors who have sought to contribute to the African peace and security agenda. The United Nations (UN) continues to be a traditional and key player in this regard. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has, for instance, been successful in establishing security for the general population. Further to this, it has served as a useful coordination mechanism through which the development agenda of the current government can be supported and advanced by the international community. Similarly, the African Union (AU) and the African sub-regional organisations can also be commended for their role in the active mobilisation of peacekeepers – a role that has often come at a great cost. It was only in September of this year that 10 AU peacekeepers were killed in Sudan's Darfur region, following an attack on their base by armed gunmen.

In addition to these traditional and more 'legitimate' purveyors of peace, an increasing number of other actors and initiatives have been established in recent years, with the stated aim of bolstering Africa's peacekeeping capacity. The Africa Command headquarters (AFRICOM), to be established by the United States (US) Department of Defense – with the mandate to coordinate US security and military interests in Africa – is one such structure. Faced with much scepticism, it seeks to address the perpetual demand for adequately trained and available African peacekeepers. In this issue, AFRICOM is explored in its historical context, and in its association to broad US military capacity-building projects, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

Related to this, the booming private security industry is also examined in this issue. Its effectiveness and efficiency as a means of augmenting Africa's peacekeeping mechanisms is still being questioned, because peacekeeping – whether undertaken by the UN, the AU or other regional entities – is a mammoth task with significant challenges. It has been expressed that the private security industry will not supersede peace operations as the primary instrument for the attainment of international peace and security – but its ability to create conditions of security and stability has been perceived by some as more effective than the AU or UN's efforts. However, the private security industry's efforts must not simply be accepted under the guise of establishing stability or peace alone, as the means to an end does not necessarily justify the means – in many instances, the private security industry has been fraught with challenges related to human rights violations, unaccountability and so on. These challenges are rendered that much more significant due to the limited structures available to regulate the industry. Therefore, emphasis needs to be placed on minimising the gap between the negative aspects of the industry and the added value to peacekeeping activities.

Moreover, this issue of *Conflict Trends* highlights the impact and consequences of civilian protection, post-conflict reintegration, elections and peacebuilding coordination as a snapshot of Africa's multifaceted needs. In order to move forward in these and other areas, a strengthened and coordinated regional and international approach is required to address pressing issues and ensure the effective mobilisation of the maximum available resources. It is also crucial to remember that, as significant as the role of the international community is in addressing Africa's conflicts, national ownership and capacity must still be harnessed. 📌

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THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN AFRICA'S PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

WRITTEN BY **SABELO GUMEDZE**



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Introduction

As Africa remains embroiled in protracted conflicts, the private security industry has become increasingly involved in the continent's peacekeeping missions. This involvement is informed by an increasing demand from governments unable to achieve stability, arising from intrastate conflicts. The United Nations (UN) deploys the largest number of its peacekeeping forces on the African continent. Current UN peacekeeping missions include the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The African Union (AU) has,

since 2004, led peace efforts in Sudan (AMIS), Somalia (AMISOM), the Central African Republic (FOMUC) and the Comoros (AMISEC). These AU missions have, among others, been backed by the African Peace Facility (APF), which is funded by the European Union. African peacekeeping missions are costly, yet their effectiveness remains a problem. Africa is increasingly experiencing an influx of the private security industry, in the form of private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies (PMCs). The industry renders security services to peacekeeping missions in Africa.

Above: Some peacekeeping missions in Africa have been dependent on the private security industry to augment their security services.

UN peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have outsourced their supply and logistical security needs to private security companies. For example, MONUC is protected or guarded by security guards employed by Magenya Protection, which is the largest supplier of risk management services to clients throughout the DRC. Outsourcing of this nature allows peacekeeping missions to concentrate on core functions, while leaving functions such as guarding services to private security companies. In some instances, the inability of peacekeeping missions to provide logistical support to their own forces warrants the involvement of the private security industry. In 2004, the US government awarded contracts worth more than \$20 million to two companies, the PAE Group and DynCorp International – the latter being a leading professional services and project management firm – to provide logistical support for African forces headed to Sudan. They were contracted to support the anticipated arrival of some 3 500 AU troops in Sudan's troubled western Darfur region. In 2005, DynCorp started helping the US government to demobilise and retire members of Liberia's armed forces and to train a new, modern army to serve Liberia's future

interests. To date, DynCorp is championing a Security Sector Reform Programme in Liberia. In 2007, the US State Department hired DynCorp to help equip and provide logistical support to international peacekeepers in Somalia, allowing the US a significant role in the critical mission without assigning combat forces.

This article discusses the role that the private security industry plays in Africa's peacekeeping missions by, firstly, defining the private security industry through PSCs and PMCs. Secondly, the article considers the peacekeeping responsibility in Africa at UN and AU levels. Thirdly, the article looks at the regulation (or lack thereof) of the security industry in African peacekeeping missions, and briefly considers the South African approach to the regulation of certain activities in situations of armed conflict.

The Private Security Industry Defined

The private security industry represents both the so-called PSCs and PMCs. Schreier and Caparini have defined PSCs as "companies that specialize in providing security and protection of personnel and property, including humanitarian and industrial assets".¹ Small argues that PSCs have the ability to provide a

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Private security companies have also assisted African peacekeeping missions with de-mining, mine-risk education and the destruction of stockpiled landmines.

“proximate capacity” for violence in the form of defensive security services, equipment and training to a variety of clients including multinational corporations, businesses, humanitarian agencies and individuals.² Singer defines PMCs as “corporate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills – including tactical combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, operational support, troop training, and technical assistance”.³ The private security industry in this context does not include mercenaries, but there is believed to be a fine line between the work of some security agencies and mercenary activities.

Some private security and military actors have been involved in direct combat, such as the now-defunct Executive Outcomes – a private organisation that was involved in fighting against rebels in Angola and Sierra Leone. In the DRC (then Zaire), the PMC GioLink aided Mobutu Sese Seko against Laurent Kabila, who was assisted by Betchel Corporation, also a PMC. Having taken over as president, Kabila’s adversaries contracted Stability Control Agencies (Stabilco), yet another PMC, to unseat him. In warding off his adversaries, Kabila sought the services of Executive Outcomes. Other private actors are involved in de-mining in Africa, an expertise that

of Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter, the Security Council is entrusted with the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”. This responsibility is more critical to Africa than any other continent, as Africa remains the most conflict-prone region in the world. Peacekeeping operations developed loosely out of the UN Charter, specifically under Chapter VI, entitled ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’.

At the regional level, peacekeeping missions are undertaken under the auspices of the AU. The AU, like its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), continues to face the challenge of ensuring peace and security in Africa. Article 5 (f) of the Constitutive Act introduces the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) as an organ tasked with the responsibility of ensuring peace and security in Africa. The PSC was established through the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSCAU Protocol), which was adopted by the AU’s 1st Ordinary Session, in Durban on 9 July 2002. The PSCAU Protocol entered into force on 26 December 2003 and replaced the Declaration on the Establishment of the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Cairo Declaration) within the OAU. The PSCAU Protocol

SECURITY AGENCIES ARE ONLY INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT TO MEET THEIR CLIENT’S NEEDS FOR PROFIT GAIN, AND NOT NECESSARILY AS OPERATIVES WORKING FOR THEIR COUNTRY THROUGH A COLLECTIVE EFFORT, AS IS THE CASE IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

is generally not easily found within the UN or the AU. De-mining programmes have been undertaken in countries such as Angola, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Zambia. ArmorGroup’s Mine Action teams, for instance, have operated in Mozambique and Sudan, among other countries. EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT) is a private security company that is credited by governments and non-governmental organisations, including the UN and Afghanistan, to perform mine actions. These actions include de-mining (i.e. the removal of landmines from the ground), victim assistance, mine-risk education and the destruction of stockpiled landmines, as well as advocating a world free of the threat of landmines.

The Peacekeeping Responsibility in Africa

At the global level, peacekeeping refers to “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”.⁴ In terms

supersedes the OAU’s resolutions and decisions relating to the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, which are in conflict with the PSCAU Protocol.

Sudan has presented the most complex peacekeeping efforts, with the formation of the AU-UN Hybrid Force, established on 31 July 2007 through UN Resolution 1769, which authorised the deployment of a 26 000-strong UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMIS). The Hybrid Force was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to take the necessary action to support implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan”. The question that will confront this force is whether or not it has the capability of succeeding in maintaining peace and security in Sudan, without the assistance of the private security industry. The Sudan conflict has a very long history with a plethora of root causes. While the AU-UN Hybrid Force concentrates on core functions such as demobilising combatants, ancillary functions

such as airlifting forces from conflict zones, rendering humanitarian assistance and guarding the missions' establishments could be best left to the private security industry.

Drawing from his experience in Somalia, Fountain⁵ argues that “[p]rivate forces offer significant advantages over national forces, and whatever challenges their use might create can be adequately managed”. He specifically notes that the Brown & Root Corporation of Houston, Texas, provided a broad range of logistical support – including building and maintaining US army bases – in Somalia. In Angola, Sierra Leone and Uganda, it was the now-defunct Executive Outcomes that successfully fought against rebel groups, at the insistence of the respective governments. This was achieved through performing a variety of functions including training, flying, communications and some combat. Just before its dissolution, Executive Outcomes had made an offer to the UN to plan, establish and maintain effective peacekeeping operations.⁶ Fountain further states that the UN itself has, in the past, been involved in hiring private actors to provide armed security, as occurred in Somalia with the employment of local heavily-armed ‘technicals’ for escort duties.

What would the world do if another Rwanda-type genocide occurred, or if a conflict arose in a failed state, and no nation with a first-class military capacity was willing to intervene or provide troops towards UN peace operations? Gantz⁷ proposes the use of the private security sector in such situations, for two reasons: firstly, to “buttress or augment capacity that otherwise would be provided by troops from contributing nations”, and secondly, because a hired PMC is capable of recruiting and deploying troops for an entire peace operation. Gantz specifically states,

“[t]he PMC would hire soldiers, deploy them in a conflict zone, defeat any spoilers to the peace process, and then presumably hand over the operation to a follow-on force of the more traditional sort, provided perhaps by the UN. Alternatively, a PMC could provide a rapid reaction combat force that would deal with spoilers that regular peacekeepers either could not or would not (for domestic political reasons) be able to deal with.”

According to the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, UN deployments in Africa grew in 2006 – and, in the case of Darfur, Africa remained the second-

largest regional contributor to UN operations.⁸ The complexity of Africa’s peacekeeping missions does require assistance from the private security industry, in one form or the other. Howe⁹, for instance, identifies private security companies as one of the three “military strategies” presently being used to increase security in sub-Saharan Africa. He views PSCs as “bearers of stability for existing authority”, meaning that PSCs are capable of making Africa more stable through the protection of legitimate regimes. To some extent this could be true, especially when one considers past experiences in African states that used PSCs to fight successfully against rebel factions, and thus continued to remain in power. Given the security challenges in Africa, Howe further argues that as long as there is a lack of adequate professional African armed forces and an unwillingness for non-African states to intervene militarily, the private security industry will have a significant role to play in peacekeeping functions.

Regulation of the Private Security Industry

While it is not disputed that the private security industry generally plays a significant role in African peacekeeping missions, this involvement is fraught with challenges. The fact that the private security industry is not regulated effectively remains the major challenge. Any task that PSCs and PMCs undertake in peacekeeping missions is based upon a contract with a client, be it the UN, AU or a government. There is no obligation on the part of either the client or the security company to make the contract public. Thus, the private contractor is only accountable to the client. The services rendered are, therefore, only those that are required by the client. As a result of these contractual obligations, most PSCs and PMCs operate in secrecy. Fulcrum International Group, for example, has a policy that it will not, under any circumstance, divulge the identities of any client to which they provide their services, for the purpose of marketing their programmes or for any other purpose.

A PMC or PSC can start up and deploy personnel faster than multinational (and perhaps national) forces because they are only accountable to their client, unlike other forces. Also, PSCs and PMCs have clearer chains of command, which are not necessarily subject to changing political desires (or fears) of the contributing nations. But it is their neutrality and independence that then becomes questionable. Security agencies are only involved in the conflict to meet their client’s needs (which are mostly not known) for profit gain, and not

THE COMPLEXITY OF AFRICA’S PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS DOES REQUIRE ASSISTANCE FROM THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY, IN ONE FORM OR THE OTHER



Peacekeeping missions usually outsource guarding services to the private security industry.

necessarily as operatives working for their country through a collective effort, as is the case in peacekeeping missions. This lack of accountability of the private security involved in African peacekeeping may be a threat to global security. Their strict code of confidentiality also introduces challenges to their regulation – and prohibition, in the event that they engage in mercenary activities or other illegal activities.

Peacekeeping missions in Africa are undertaken either under the auspices of the UN, AU or regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). None of these organisations have a known policy for engaging the private security industry in peacekeeping missions. While these organisations – especially the UN – also contract the private security industry to undertake non-core functions (such as protecting or guarding their establishments), this has sometimes been viewed as a means of legitimising certain questionable activities, such as being involved in combat operations for mineral resources gains. At the AU level, the closest relevant framework for PMCs and PSCs is the 1977 OAU Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. While this convention does not necessarily address the challenges presented by the involvement of the private security industry in

peacekeeping missions, it only prohibits mercenary activities. The convention is now outdated and does not in any way cover the involvement of PMCs and PSCs operating in peacekeeping missions. The situation is more challenging, because African states have been caught unawares by the influx of PMCs and PSCs in African conflicts, peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance operations and extractive industries. Most of these security agencies come from outside Africa.

African states have generally not realised the need for regulating PMCs and PSCs either within their own jurisdiction or elsewhere in Africa, especially in peacekeeping missions. So far South Africa, which has been the largest African state contributor to the private security industry, has sought to regulate foreign military assistance by South Africans through the Foreign Military Assistance Act No. 15 of 1998. This act is to be replaced by the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill, which is currently awaiting presidential confirmation. This bill, which has an extraterritorial jurisdiction, will have an impact on South African citizens and permanent residents wishing to render any form of assistance in what is referred to as an area or country of armed conflict. An area or country

of armed conflict, in terms of Section 6 of the bill, is that which is proclaimed as such by the president, as the head of the National Executive.

Peacekeeping missions involve the rendering of a variety of services and assistance. These include any form of military or military-related assistance, service or activity; any form of assistance, service or activity by means of advice or training; personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support; personnel recruitment; medical or paramedical services, or procurement of equipment; or security services. Security services include one or more of the following: protection or safeguarding of an individual, personnel or property in any manner; giving advice on the protection or safeguarding of individuals or property; giving advice on the use of security systems; providing a reactive or response service; providing security training or instruction to a security provider or prospective security service provider; installing, servicing or repairing security equipment; monitoring signals or transmission from security equipment; making a person or service available, directly or indirectly for the rendering of security service; and managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of security services.

Through its Section 3, the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill prohibits the provision of certain assistance or rendering of services in an area of armed conflict, without the authorisation of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee. Sometimes, peacekeeping missions involve the recruitment of forces that join foreign forces in undertaking combat activities in a third country. Through Section 4 of the bill, South Africans or permanent residents are prohibited from enlisting in foreign armed forces, without the authorisation of the Arms Control Committee. In response to peacekeeping missions that involve the rendering of humanitarian assistance, Section 5 of the bill also prohibits any South African or permanent resident from rendering assistance in an area of armed conflict, without the Arms Control Committee's authorisation.

Conclusion

As long as Africa has protracted conflicts, peacekeeping missions will be established. As long as Africa has peacekeeping missions, the need for the private security industry to augment such peacekeeping mission efforts – through the UN, AU or any other inter-governmental body or state – will remain. Whether this involvement will actually play a role in successfully mitigating African conflicts remains to be seen. One of the reasons cited by Sandline International for its operation closure in volatile places, including Iraq,

on 16 April 2004 was “the general lack of governmental support for Private Military Companies willing to help end armed conflicts in places like Africa, in the absence of effective international intervention”.¹⁰ It is unfortunate that the kind of ‘help’ that PSCs and PMCs render in armed conflicts, and peacekeeping missions in particular, is generally unclear, due to the secrecy involved in their operations. While South Africa has defined the terms and conditions for this kind of ‘help’, the UN and the AU in particular must be challenged to engage this matter. This is in order to regulate the industry – which is becoming significantly involved in Africa's peacekeeping missions, and sometimes posing a serious security threat to humanity – effectively. 📌

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THE ROLE OF AFRICOM: OBSERVER, ENFORCER OR FACILITATOR OF PEACE?

WRITTEN BY **GERRIE SWART**

The creation of the Pentagon's new Africa Command (AFRICOM) has elicited much debate, outrage, concern and interest since the announcement was first made that the United States of America plans to formalise its presence and operations on the African continent. AFRICOM appears, at first glance, to be a radical departure from the stated foreign policy intentions of the Bush administration towards Africa, upon assuming office in 2001. The Bush foreign policy team castigated the Clinton administration as having pursued an overly idealistic and ultimately unsuccessful 'feel good' policy towards Africa.¹ Throughout the Cold War, United States (US) presidents traditionally devoted less attention to Africa,

compared to other regions of perceived greater concern. During the election campaign, presidential candidate George W Bush noted that the continent did not "fit into the national strategic interests" of the US, as far as he could envision.² This response was consistent with a realist approach, which perceived Africa as marginal

Above: US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, arrived in Djibouti, in December 2007, to discuss the future of US military operations in Africa, specifically the Pentagon's new Africa Command launched in October 2007.

at best, in terms of US national security interests. As a presidential candidate, George W Bush also expressed his strong aversion to US involvement in peacemaking operations in Africa and often referred to them during the 2000 presidential campaign as “ill-conceived exercises in nation-building”.

With the advent of the Pentagon’s new AFRICOM, it appears as if US foreign and security policies regarding Africa are in a major period of flux – towards greater engagement on the African continent. Yet, the vexing question that will be asked in the run-up to the establishment of AFRICOM remains: what nature and shape will this engagement take? This article accords specific attention to the peace and security objectives of the Pentagon’s new AFRICOM, and explores related issues of concern to the US, as it prepares to operationalise the command in 2008.

Mission and Mandate: Defining AFRICOM’s Role

AFRICOM’s most salient role is its objective of developing a stable environment on the continent, to promote civil society and improve the quality of life for the people of Africa. This was stressed from the outset by key US policymakers. On the occasion of her testimony to the US House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, highlighted the most significant role envisioned for AFRICOM:

“The US Africa Command’s foremost mission is to help Africans achieve their own security, not to extend the scope of the war on terrorism or secure African resources. The United States spends approximately US\$9 billion a year in Africa, funding programs in such areas as health, development, trade promotion, and good governance. AFRICOM will play a supportive role as Africans continue to build democratic institutions and establish good governance across the continent. The Defense Department currently divides responsibility for Africa among three combatant commands: European Command, Pacific Command and Central Command. AFRICOM, slated to stand up in October 2008, is a three-pronged defense, diplomatic and economic effort designed to enable US government

elements to work in concert with African partners without the “bureaucratic divisions” created by a shared command structure. US Africa Command also will support other US agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional stability.”³

As defined by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM’s mission will be to promote US strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organisations to help strengthen stability and security in the region through improved security capability, military professionalism and accountable governance. The command’s military operations will aim to deter aggression and respond to crises.⁴ AFRICOM will have a strong emphasis on building the capacity of African nations through training and equipping African militaries, conducting training and medical missions on the continent, and supporting regional organisations such as the African Union (AU).

Some DOD officials have referred to the proposed AFRICOM as “combatant command plus”. This implies that the command will execute all the associated roles and responsibilities of a traditional combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead military operations, but will also include a broader ‘soft power’ mandate aimed at reducing conflict preemptively.⁵ Although US armed forces have traditionally focused on “fighting and winning wars”, the defence strategy is now evolving to focus on conflict prevention or “Phase Zero” operations, addressing threats at their inception.⁶ According to the Pentagon, the command’s primary mission will be ‘shaping’ activities designed to ameliorate troubling trends before they reach a crisis, rather than traditional operations involving the use of force.

The creation of a fully operational AFRICOM by the US comes at an opportune time when Africa faces the growing threat of poverty, underdevelopment, conflict and international terrorism in certain countries. This also represents a radical departure from a once-averse US government to becoming ‘bogged down’ in nation-building exercises, which increasingly appears to be one of the primary tasks in which AFRICOM will find itself engaged.

AFRICOM’S MISSION WILL BE TO PROMOTE US STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES BY WORKING WITH AFRICAN STATES AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS TO HELP STRENGTHEN STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE REGION THROUGH IMPROVED SECURITY CAPABILITY, MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE

Many US Defense Department officials have stressed that the purpose of AFRICOM is not to wage war, but to work in concert with its African partners for a more stable environment, in which political and economic growth can take place. Perhaps the most interesting and puzzling dimension of AFRICOM in this regard is that no new US troops will be deployed to the continent, and no new military bases will be established on the continent, when the command becomes fully operational in 2008.

AFRICOM's structure is also a major departure from traditional combatant commands. The new command will seek to implement far greater inter-agency coordination with other US institutions, such as the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This will include the placement of a senior State Department official at the level equivalent to that of a deputy commander.⁷ AFRICOM will also feature a major new command element, known as the Directorate of Civil-Military Affairs. The directorate's mission will be to oversee the command's capacity-building efforts, and will serve as the primary organ through which liaison with the AU and African Standby Force will take place.

AFRICOM could potentially falter, due to the lack of the creation of a credible permanent US standby force, acting in concert with African troops, ready to be deployed if and when it becomes necessary to resort to military action. Invariably, this will be necessitated, especially in African states presently experiencing full-scale war and conflict. This will warrant the permanent deployment of some form of visible troop presence, most notably in those areas where peace, stability and national security have all but disintegrated in the face of war and civil strife. Furthermore, AFRICOM has a lofty mission statement and mandate, which will require considerable manpower and focus on many highly complex issues. Seen in this context, this will necessarily require a permanent presence of highly trained experts and resources, beyond the mere bureaucratic reshuffle that has been suggested by the Pentagon. In this context, AFRICOM may be setting itself up for failure and potential overstretch.

Addressing Africa's Security Threats: Mission Impossible?

As pointed out by Ploch, the establishment of the new AFRICOM reflects an evolution in policymakers' perceptions of US strategic interests in Africa. In this respect, there has been a "conceptual shift to a strategic view of Africa".⁸ Yet, while AFRICOM appears to represent a grand vision of redefining the nature of the engagement with the African continent, the US appears to have lost sight of the potential difficulties that could



REUTERS / THE BIGGER PICTURE

Securing Nigeria's oil fields is a US priority as it is a major source of the US's oil.

be encountered in responding effectively to the various complex crises that Africa presents. The envisioned operational nodes scattered across the entire African continent may not be sufficient in addressing these crises in a timely and coordinated manner. The US has various interests it seeks to protect on the continent, and a relatively strong aversion to a US presence exists in virtually all these spheres.

One of the critical issues is related to securing access to natural resources, particularly oil. In this respect, Africa – in particular, Nigeria – is considered to be the fifth largest global supplier of oil to the US. Conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta has severely undermined oil production and output, and attacks



An American marine officer at the Dakar port represents the US-navy's concern with boosting Africa's maritime security.

on oil facilities and pipelines continue to pose a major security threat to this resource. One of the primary missions envisioned by the US is to ensure the security of Nigeria's oil fields. This will, however, prove to be extremely difficult, given the relative opposition to any US presence in the oil-rich Niger Delta by the country's local population.

Another major concern is Africa's relatively weak maritime security. Africa's coastlines, especially along the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, have seen a large incidence of illegal fishing, trafficking and piracy. The inability of African governments to provide effective and visible maritime security continues to pose severe threats, and has allowed criminal elements to participate in large-scale smuggling of people, drugs, weapons and hazardous waste materials.⁹ The US Navy, in particular, has increased its presence in the Gulf of Guinea, while envisioning more long-term deployments in the future. While the focus is clearly protecting the resource and oil-rich Gulf of Guinea, an equally serious threat remains in the Indian Ocean. There, high incidences of piracy have occurred along the coast of war-torn Somalia, and the threat that Al-Qaeda could pose in these relatively unguarded waters remains a major concern.¹⁰

Another major contributing factor to Africa's insecurity and instability has been violent, brutal and protracted conflict. The African continent is, at present, the site of nearly six UN peacekeeping missions. August 2007 heralded important developments in addressing the lack of peace and security in Sudan's Darfur region. The UN Security Council authorised the deployment of up to 26 000 troops and police for Darfur, and approved the use of force to protect civilians in Sudan's arid western region. The combined 'hybrid' UN-AU operation aims to quell violence in Darfur, where more than 2.1 million people have been driven into camps, and an estimated 200 000 have died over the past four years. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who conducted months of talks with the Khartoum government, described the unanimously-approved resolution as "historic and unprecedented", and said the mission would "make a clear and positive difference". The resolution, number 1769, invokes Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, under which the organisation can authorise force. The measure allows the use of force for self-defence, to ensure the free movement of humanitarian workers and to protect civilians under attack.

The recent devastating attack on AU soldiers after an armed assault on their camp in the Darfur region has, yet again, highlighted the vulnerability of such operations, in those instances where there is a lack of operational capability, adequate manpower and effective training. A permanent US presence could play a highly constructive supporting role in providing training to those African states that participate in such peace operations and missions, in order to bolster US efforts in achieving peace and security on the continent. This will necessarily require working in partnership with all African states in order to counter negative perceptions of the US military. Addressing the multiple challenges and threats facing Africa will require an actively and permanently engaged US presence as well. The issue that has overshadowed all else is the threat posed by international terrorism in Africa. Negative perceptions

in the 1998 embassy attacks). In this respect, however, a number of other crucial initiatives have already been implemented to combat terrorism.

In October 2002, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) developed a joint task force to focus on “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region”, and to provide a forward presence in the region. Approximately 1 500 US military and civilian personnel make up the Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which covers land and airspace in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Seychelles, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen, as well as the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.¹³

In 2002, the Department of State launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) programme to increase border security and counter-terrorism capacities of four West

MANY US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE STRESSED THAT THE PURPOSE OF AFRICOM IS NOT TO WAGE WAR, BUT TO WORK IN CONCERT WITH ITS AFRICAN PARTNERS FOR A MORE STABLE ENVIRONMENT, IN WHICH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH CAN TAKE PLACE

towards the US have been particularly pronounced on the country's counter-terrorism strategy. In particular, African states fear that AFRICOM is the sinister manifestation of an expanded war on terror in Africa.

AFRICOM's Role in Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Pariah or Partner?

Current US security policy has been dominated by the global war on terrorism. This has evoked considerable concern from African states, which fear becoming potential targets in an expanded war on terrorism on the African continent. A major concern to US policymakers is the challenge and threat posed by ‘ungoverned spaces’ – defined as physical or non-physical areas where there is the absence of state capacity or political will to exercise effective governmental control.¹¹ President George W Bush indicated that failing states are potential breeding grounds for terrorism. Africa has, however, not received sufficient political attention to the threat, or sufficient funding to combat it.¹²

The puzzling aspect is that the new AFRICOM is reportedly not being touted as a direct tool to be utilised in counter-terrorism initiatives – clearly one of the priority areas since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (and since US operations were conducted in April 2007 off the coast of East Africa, targeting suspected Al-Qaeda militants hiding in Somalia, who were allegedly involved

African nations: Mali, Chad, Niger and Mauritania. In 2005, the Bush administration announced a ‘follow-on’ programme to the PSI. According to the State Department, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI) “would look beyond the provision of training and equipment for counter-terrorism units, but also would consider development assistance, expanded public diplomacy campaigns and other elements as part of an overall counter-terrorism strategy”. Under the American military component Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara, implemented by EUCOM, US forces have worked with their African counterparts from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia to improve intelligence, command and control, logistics and border control, and to execute joint operations against terrorist groups. US and African forces have conducted joint exercises, such as Exercise Flintlock, to improve security partnerships initiated under PSI and TSCTI.

US counter-terror operations are not new on the African continent. However, in the context of an expanded war on terror and the pre-emptive military strikes against Iraq, concern is growing. The world has also witnessed an overtly militant and confrontational US foreign and defence policy manifesting itself since the second Bush administration came to power, with very little prospect of this hard-line policy waning in the

near future. In this context, many African states await the coming of AFRICOM to the continent with great trepidation, uneasiness and concern.

African Responses and Reactions to AFRICOM

A great sense of reluctance to embrace the advent of AFRICOM exists, even though analysts state that there is already a substantial American presence on the continent, that will now only be formalised within a more bureaucratic structure (that is, AFRICOM). Yet this does not put African observers or analysts at ease. African states continue to adopt a wary approach towards the advent of AFRICOM, as it could formalise the militarisation of US-African relations, whereby the Pentagon would be taking the lead role in the promotion of US interests on the continent. AFRICOM will not only militarise US-African relations, but also those African countries in which it will be located. This could have far-reaching consequences, as the presence of US bases in these countries will potentially lead to greater support and sympathy for radical militants opposed to the US, and make Americans targets of violence.¹⁴ Therefore, the presence of AFRICOM is likely to generate further anti-American sentiments. This is obviously one of the key areas that its architects should carefully consider

AFRICOM's mandate and mission statement is likely to stir further debate as its launch nears. What is clear is that realist conceptions of security and interests are likely to shape and direct the final structure and functions of AFRICOM. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Theresa Whelan, stresses that since the events of 9/11 – combined with 20/20 hindsight – it has become clear that Africa has become integral, not peripheral, to global security in general, and US security in particular.¹⁶ In the same argument raised by Whelan, there is the realisation that African security issues can no longer be viewed as only humanitarian in nature. US national interests are tied to promoting a secure and stable African continent.

While this appears to be a narrow, self-interested view, the US appears ready, willing and able to adopt a holistic approach in recognising the need to promote sustainable security and stability in Africa, by assisting the continent to achieve good governance, the rule of law and economic opportunity. These are interests that are likely to conflict on several key junctures, and there will be great difficulty in achieving unanimous consensus amongst Africa's leadership on whether the US is adopting a more altruistic foreign policy abroad or acting in pure self-interest.

AFRICAN STATES FEAR THAT AFRICOM IS THE SINISTER MANIFESTATION OF AN EXPANDED WAR ON TERROR IN AFRICA

when the time comes for the command to initiate its operations. This will necessitate a greater role for the envisioned Directorate of Civil-Military Relations, in ensuring that African states are consulted on any envisioned operations and actions that AFRICOM seeks to initiate.

US military engagement on the African continent is by no means a novelty. However, the nature of the engagement and the manner in which it will be presented to a less-than-receptive African audience will be pivotal to whether or not AFRICOM will succeed. Furthermore, much scepticism will persist as the US continues to 'sell' AFRICOM as a major departure from its past engagement with Africa. Ultimately, Africa's strategic importance to the US continues to be defined in terms of security objectives, which are deemed more urgent and pronounced than ever before. South Africa's Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota has already ruled out the possibility that SADC will host or cooperate with AFRICOM, which could serve as a stumbling block for the US and AFRICOM, if other regional African bodies adopt a similar position.¹⁵

This is the delicate balance of interests that AFRICOM will have to oversee and reconcile in order to achieve both the almost insurmountable task of creating a stable, peaceful and wholly prosperous African continent and a greater sense of security for the US, simultaneously. This is not a mission that will be accomplished overnight, nor will it be a debate that is likely to reflect a common set of opinions or conclusions that will be satisfactory to either side. AFRICOM's envisioned approach will imply that the US will find itself frequently immersed in dealing with Africa's plethora of crises. These crises cannot be considered, approached or dealt with in isolation, or by adopting one instrument to the exclusion of others.

A delicate balance of diplomacy will be critical in the new strategic approach towards Africa. This will prove to be the critical determinant in whether the US will be building bridges in Africa, or burning them. 🏗️

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Military chiefs from the US and nine African countries met in Dakar, in February 2007, following the announcement by the US to establish the new Africa Command.

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CIVILIAN PROTECTION IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING: A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

WRITTEN BY **ONWUKA ONYINYE NKECHI**

Introduction

The demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the Soviet Union in 1991, which brought an end to super-power competition and the Cold War conflict, altered the international security system. Since the end of the Cold War, the most marked security problem has been the proliferation of armed conflict within states.

While violent conflicts are not unique to the African continent, within the past few decades Africa has probably suffered more from armed conflicts than any other continent. Many of the conflicts are characterised by intractable political and humanitarian consequences. Efforts to suppress armed insurgent groups have, in too many cases, led to excessive and disproportionate actions by governments. This has often produced excessive and unwarranted suffering on the part of civilian populations. In most cases, these conflicts have centred on demands for greater political rights and other political objectives; demands that were, in many cases, forcibly suppressed during the Cold War.¹ These conflicts and their consequences have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and human rights.

Another significant change in the international security system since the end of Cold War has been the expanded scope of peacekeeping operations globally. Traditional peacekeeping initially developed as a means of dealing with interstate conflict. The challenge of the plethora of intrastate conflicts has made peacekeeping operations increasingly more complex, requiring multi-dimensional approaches. Accordingly, the mandate of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations now covers a number of non-military tasks. These include promoting human security, assisting in the demobilisation of former combatants, strengthening the rule of law, training of police forces, humanitarian relief, monitoring respect of human rights and protecting economic and social development.²

Whereas peacekeeping has received accolades with regard to its role in conflict management, one worrisome trend has been the increased vulnerability of the civilian population in most operations. In recent years, there have been growing instances of UN, African Union (AU) and regional organisations such as the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeepers committing severe crimes against the people they are meant to protect while on peacekeeping duties. These crimes often take the form of gender-based violence and abuse.³ Women, predominantly, have become targets of various types of assault, ranging from rape and unwanted pregnancies to sexual slavery.

This article is a gender analysis of the broader issues of civilian protection in peacekeeping operations in Africa. It is important to re-examine the impact of conflict management and resolution strategies (such as peacekeeping) on women's lives in practical terms and how, as women, they can be protected from the associated violating activities of wars. The article advocates that, beyond protection, members of peacekeeping missions in Africa who perpetrate gender-based violence and abuse must be adequately punished. Gender training for peacekeepers, and the increased participation of women in peacekeeping operations in Africa, will greatly reduce cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel.

Background

Even though peacekeeping is not specifically provided for in the UN Charter (chapters VI and VII of the charter contain the provisions for peacekeeping operations), it has evolved as a pragmatic response to a variety of international conflicts. Peacekeeping in Africa has been motivated by various events and initiatives from within and outside the continent. There is the humanitarian justification, in which peacekeeping missions play significant intervention roles in the management

GENDER TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPERS, AND THE INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA, WILL GREATLY REDUCE CASES OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL



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The first all-female unit of United Nations peacekeepers, in Liberia, to help train the local police force (2007).

and resolution of African and other international armed conflicts. From the point of view of international concern and solidarity, this interest is legitimate, because the continent breeds the greatest number of crises, armed conflicts and humanitarian casualties.

Within Africa, there is an increasing focus on and commitment to collective regional security. The AU overturned the non-interference principle of the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU), declaring that, because of the claims of sovereignty, Africa could no longer be indifferent to the armed conflicts, war crimes or gross abuses taking place on the continent. Between 1960 and 1998, there were 32 wars in Africa; seven million lives were lost and over nine million people became refugees, returnees or displaced. In 1996 alone, 14 out of 53 African countries were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide.⁴ The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) alone has involved no fewer than four states, and over 50 million people of the Great Lakes region.⁵ Similarly, the 17-year civil war in Sudan has resulted in more than two million people dead and

at least five million people displaced. It has brought starvation and extreme poverty to the Sudanese people. In particular, the most vulnerable and affected people are the women and children. In the South Kivu province of the DRC, over 27 000 cases of sexual violence were reported in 2005 and 2006. From March 2006 to April 2007, 6 000 cases of sexual violence were reported in Ituri, also in the east of the DRC.⁶

The provisions in articles 51 and 54 of Protocol 1 of the International Humanitarian Law, which affirms “the prohibition against direct attack or reprisal attacks on civilians, including those intended to spread terror among the population”⁷, is not adhered to in most of these conflicts as, increasingly, civilians form the overwhelming majority of victims of armed conflicts in Africa. Many of these attacks are either perpetuated by government or rebel factions. For instance, in Sierra Leone, about 4.5 million people were displaced, while 10 000 became victims of amputation and rape, mostly at the hands of the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF).⁸ It has been alleged that in West Africa, governments use rebel groups in neighbouring countries to fight and

unleash terror on civilians. Specifically, in Côte d'Ivoire, the recruitment of Liberians from refugee and transit camps to conduct reprisals against political enemies has largely undermined civilian protection.⁹ In the Sudan conflict, a former Minister of State of the Interior, Ahmed Muhammed Haroun, and a Janjaweed commander, Ali Muhammed Ali Abd-al-Rahman, are accused of various forms of war crimes against civilians in Darfur.¹⁰

The current global debate on the right of humanitarian intervention, which has galvanised into what is known as the doctrine of 'The Responsibility to Protect', is the outcome of the interrogation of the appropriate states to take coercive – and, in particular, military – action against another a country in armed conflict, for the purpose of protecting civilians at risk.¹¹ Such protection should take into account the real concerns of civilians during armed conflict, such as the violation of human rights, displacement, the lack of basic services and the physical security of citizens. It should ensure that assistance is offered to the most vulnerable groups – women

and children. It has also become imperative to focus attention on some negative activities by international peacekeepers and humanitarian relief agencies towards civilians during operations.

Gender Concerns in African Peacekeeping Operations

Gender usually refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female. It also defines power relations in society and determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or man in a given context.¹² In this particular context, gender analysis of civilian protection in peacekeeping involves the assessment of the specific needs and vulnerabilities of women as civilians during peacekeeping operations.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 recognises that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict.¹³ Article 18 (3) of the African

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The United Nations recognises that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict.

Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter), provides that states shall, among other things, ensure the protection of the rights of women and children, as stipulated in international declarations and conventions.¹⁴ These declarations and conventions, however, are not specified in the African Charter. This also suggests that the rights of women and children in conflict situations are guaranteed under international declarations and conventions.

In Resolution 61/134, the General Assembly urged all member states to take effective measures to address gender-based violence in humanitarian emergencies, and to make all possible efforts to ensure that their laws and institutions are adequate to prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of gender-based violence.¹⁵ The UN Security Council, in Resolution 1674, condemned "in the strongest terms" all sexual and other forms of violence against civilians in armed conflict, in particular women and children. The Council undertook to ensure that peace support operations work to prevent such violence, and

While peacekeepers are charged with preventing atrocities meted out on civilians during conflicts, they have sometimes been found to be involved in committing these very crimes, against those under their protection. However, violence perpetuated by humanitarian aid workers and peacekeepers must be seen in a broader context that examines the inherent power differential between them and the community, whether physical, monetary or influential. Social crises, economic depressions, survival needs of the families and disempowerment increase the vulnerability of the local population, especially the women.

For more than a decade, informal reports have circulated about the behaviour of soldiers on peacekeeping missions. However, in the last five years, there has been considerable attention focused on the issue of sexual misconduct by UN staff, international peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. One of the early publicised cases of gender crime committed by peacekeepers in Africa occurred in Somalia, during

THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THE SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE RECORDED IN PEACEKEEPING RESULTS IN INCREASED LOCAL RESENTMENT TOWARDS PEACEKEEPERS WHICH, IN SOME CASES, ENDANGERS PEACEKEEPERS' INDIVIDUAL HEALTH AND SECURITY

address its impact where it takes place.¹⁶

Peacekeeping missions are deployed in situations of great insecurity and instability, civilian violation, violence and sexual abuse of the populace. Peacekeepers' responsibilities include preventing violence, especially gender-based violence. Gender-based violence in this context refers to violence targeting women or men, on the basis of their gender or sexual orientation. It includes – but is not limited to – sexual violence, which is often used as an instrument of terror and torture in armed conflict situations.

During violent conflicts, men and women suffer the direct and indirect effects of fighting, enduring indiscriminate bombing and attacks as well as the lack of food and other essentials needed for survival. However, women bear greater burden during conflicts, and are more vulnerable during peacekeeping operations. For instance, with men involved in war, the traditional support mechanism for protection in the community is broken, thereby exposing women to increased risks. Ironically, many of these women believe that their gender will protect them from hostilities. But contrary to their beliefs, women are frequently targeted precisely because they are female.

the missions from 1993 to 1995. Belgian, Canadian, Italian and Pakistani peacekeepers were implicated in egregious acts against civilians, including torture, murder and rape.¹⁷ In Liberia, some studies suggest that between 60% and 70% of women experienced physical or sexual abuse by both combatants and peacekeepers – namely the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring and Observer Group (ECOMOG) and the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). From December 2004 to August 2006, at least 140 allegations of sexual exploitation involving UN personnel in the DRC were recorded.¹⁸ Again, peacekeepers in UN Operations in Somalia (UNSOM II), Mozambique and Sierra Leone have been accused of raping civilian women and promoting the illegal sex industries in those countries. Only recently did the UN commence investigations of widespread sexual abuse and exploitation of hundreds of women by peacekeepers serving in the Bouake, a northern rebel stronghold in Côte d'Ivoire.

While some argue that most allegations against peacekeepers cannot be equated with the scale and terror of random, brutal and systematic rape in warfare, it is equally another context of vulnerable women and girls being abused; this time by uniformed men in positions

of power. Perhaps it is because international peacekeepers and aid workers have such an important physical and symbolic status (that represents international aspirations of human dignity, security and civilian protection), that the abuse of their position is considered by many as unacceptable. In other words, rape and sexual abuse by peacekeepers is in every respect a gross violation of their duty to protect the local population. Examples of unintended consequences of questionable peacekeeping activities are distortions in the local economy, corruption, the spread of HIV/AIDS, horrific physical and psychological scars, an increase in prostitution and other undesirable social practices, teenage pregnancies and sexual violence against women and children. Such unintended consequences can influence the success of a peacekeeping mission, and damage the credibility of the UN and other regional organisations. The overall effect of the sexual exploitation and abuse recorded in peacekeeping results in increased local resentment towards peacekeepers which, in some cases, endangers peacekeepers' individual health and security. It is clear that a 'peace' that neglects the interests of a larger part of the community, or that supports, reconstructs and, in some cases, strengthens the inequalities in the power structure – relegating women to roles of subordination and inferiority – cannot truly be a peace worth having, and is unlikely to be sustainable.¹⁹

International Responses

UN Resolution 1325 emphasises the responsibility of states to put an end to impunity and war crimes, including those relating to sexual violence against women and girls. Specifically, in response to reports of serious human right violations committed by peacekeepers, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a directive that all forces operating under UN command abide by international laws protecting civilians and governing the conduct of soldiers in war. Subsequently, the UN expressed its 'zero tolerance' policy towards sexual abuse and contact with local populations. Further, the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Peacekeepers instructs that they do not indulge in sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population, especially women and children. The code underscores the fact that peacekeepers and other aid workers who engage in

transactional sex, however willing the local women may appear, are de facto exploiting the very people they are supposed to protect. Where substantiated, these acts warrant summary dismissal in the case of civilian staff, and reparation and subsequent disciplinary action by member states for military and civilian police personnel.

One major deficiency in the UN's attempt to address the cases of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions is the fact that it lacks the power to punish directly or deal with infractions in peacekeeping missions. The UN has no means or authority to bring perpetrators to justice, but can only report them. Exclusive jurisdiction is granted to the member state in whose forces the soldiers serve, in uniformity with the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. Again, because sexual scandal during peacekeeping assignments would tarnish a country's reputation, considerable effort is made to deal with such matters quietly. Another challenge, besides enforcement, is the difficulty in ascertaining what can be called sexual exploitation, as sometimes local women willingly consent to sexual demands from peacekeepers and aid workers, by personal choice or for negotiated favours. The difficulty lies in the definition of sexual exploitation as any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power or trust for sexual purposes. But the issues of abuse are more explicit, as it refers to actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions. The issue of rape and the outright prohibition of sex with under-age women (below the age of 18) must be taken more seriously.

A comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Exploitation and Abuse in the UN Peacekeeping Operations was released in February 2005, and the report outlines rules governing the conduct of UN personnel. It recommends that the General Assembly investigates allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, and other misconduct of a similar grave nature, particularly those involving children.²⁰ The UN also launched UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, a coalition of 12 UN entities that aim to do just that, as well as to support national efforts to prevent sexual violence and respond effectively to the needs of survivors. In Sierra Leone, local and international non-governmental organisations, UN agencies and some government bodies

ONE MAJOR DEFICIENCY IN THE UN'S ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS THE CASES OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IS THE FACT THAT IT LACKS THE POWER TO PUNISH DIRECTLY OR DEAL WITH INFRACTIONS IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS



The increased participation of women in peacekeeping operations in Africa will greatly reduce the cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel.

collaborated through the Interagency Coordinating Committee for the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CCSEA).²¹ Training is the key component in CCSEA's strategy. This training is to ensure that all relief and development workers are educated on the need to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, and have a common understanding of standards of behaviour. Gender understanding of violence should not simply highlight women's victimisation, but also mainstream gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations. This is a strategy that will ensure that the concerns and experiences of women, as well as men, are factored into the planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all policies and programmes, in all spheres of the mission. The principle is to allow both men and women to benefit from assistance and programmes, and to be consulted and involved in the process.

Gender mainstreaming is undertaken by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and

some recommendations include the appointment of specialist gender advisors to UN missions, increasing the number of women leading and serving in peace operations, and the provision of gender awareness training to peacekeeping personnel.

Conclusion

Armed conflicts remain a serious security challenge for Africa. Peacekeeping operations must equally be effective enough to deal with the security challenges of arms proliferation, refugee crises, the spread of HIV/AIDS and the proliferation of irregular roving mercenaries within the continent. On the whole, civilian protection in peacekeeping operations is complex. Indeed, having a peacekeeping operation that fails to keep the peace could be worse than continuing the fighting, with no peace. Nevertheless, civilian protection should remain the core mandate in any peacekeeping mission. Effective civilian protection in peacekeeping operations thus



Women bear a greater burden during conflicts and are more vulnerable during peacekeeping operations.

demands robust coordination and a more coherent multidimensional approach involving international, national, moral, humanitarian and legal instruments.

Women must be more involved in all aspects of protection, including peacekeeping itself. This would make a significant difference to attitudes operating in the usual male-dominated missions. The DPKO must ensure that gender protection concerns are fully integrated into peacekeeping efforts in practical terms, and that implementation of the resolutions on the protection of civilians ensures a more systematic inclusion of women's concerns. If there is one thing that must occur above all, it is to end the culture of impunity that underlies so many abuses. More broadly, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague should be expanded to include the prosecution of peacekeepers for serious crimes committed in operations. Currently, the ICC mandate prosecutes crimes against humanity such as torture, genocide and war crimes.

Finally, African heads of state must invest more in conflict prevention: in facilitating political solutions through increased mediation capacity and support to

resolve conflict, as well as focusing on peacebuilding measures to prevent rapid relapse into conflict. These measures will definitely reduce incessant armed conflicts and the deployment of international peacekeeping missions, and further address the associated abuses of vulnerable groups. 🗨️

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POST-CONFLICT REINTEGRATION CHALLENGES IN SIERRA LEONE

WRITTEN BY **ZINURINE ABIODU ALGHALI**



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Introduction

The Sierra Leone conflict escalated in March 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched attacks from Liberian territory into Sierra Leone to overthrow the All People's Congress (APC) government, led by former president Joseph S. Momoh. Unlike other conflicts, provoked by inter-ethnic or religious strife, the crisis in Sierra Leone was a product of a complex combination of internal and external factors. These included nepotism and rampant corruption of those in power, the erosion of state institutions, competition between various factions within the government for control of the country's natural wealth, and external interests in destabilising the country.

The conflict became more complex after the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) government, led by Tejan-Kabba, was overthrown in May 1997 by disgruntled Sierra Leone Army (SLA) officers, who invited the RUF to join forces with them to form the Armed Forces Revolutionary

Council (AFRC). In February 1998, this junta government was ousted by a Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), with support from a few loyal SLA officers and the Civil Defence Force (CDF) – a pro-government militia that was mobilised by the then-deputy defence minister, Chief Sam Hinga Norman. On 6 January 1999, AFRC and RUF forces stormed the capital, Freetown. Before they were repelled, they burnt down part of the city, and killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of civilians in less than a month. The international community, however, succeeded in negotiating a temporary ceasefire, which

Above: Former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) child combatants load into UN trucks following a ceremony in which they were released from the fighting forces and returned to civilian life in May 2001 in Makeni, Sierra Leone.

eventually led to the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord and the end of hostilities.

On 18 January 2002, the 10-year civil war came to a formal end. The change started with the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants, with the ultimate aim of reintegrating ex-combatants into society. Reintegration (the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income) is a major challenge confronting Sierra Leone. During the war, combatants committed widespread atrocities against civilians, including those in their own communities. These acts of violence created guilt, suspicion and fear about prospects for their return to communities. Promoting and fostering reconciliation between ex-combatants and other community members remains a crucial challenge that impacts national progress.

Sierra Leone is still an extremely poor country, highly dependent on external aid. With the very high unemployment rate, securing employment for ex-combatants represents a major challenge to post-conflict reintegration. The danger of disgruntled ex-combatants drifting into crime – or even renewed conflict – remains a potential threat.

Reintegration Objectives

The main objectives of the reintegration component of Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme were:

- to facilitate and support the return of ex-combatants to their home communities or preferred communities of return;
- to assist the ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities;
- to utilise the potential of ex-combatants for social and economic reconstruction;
- to promote social acceptance and reconciliation; and
- to reduce the fiscal impact of large defence budgets by providing alternative employment support options for demobilised ex-combatants.¹

The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), with support from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and other stakeholders, succeeded in disarming an estimated 72 490 fighters in less than two years, and restored state authority across the country. However, there remain numerous challenges to sustainable post-conflict reintegration in Sierra Leone. Only about 54 439 ex-combatants benefited from the skills training programme, whilst only about 45 000 ex-combatants (as well as some dependants) received food and cooking utensils.² Even the fortunate ones who did receive training found it extremely difficult to secure employment, due to the unavailability of jobs.

All these problems can be attributed to the fact that reintegration was implemented rather hastily to meet

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Disarmament was a major focus of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration phase in post-conflict Sierra Leone.

THE DANGER OF DISGRUNTLED EX-COMBATANTS DRIFTING INTO CRIME – OR EVEN RENEWED CONFLICT – REMAINS A POTENTIAL THREAT

a required deadline, and was considered completed by the end of the DDR programme. Also, funds were exhausted in the disarmament and demobilisation phase, with little left for the reintegration component. This is significant, as it is impossible for ex-combatants to forget about their combat life completely during disarmament and demobilisation, if they are not gainfully employed. This would require the support of the reintegration component – a more complex, costly and long-term endeavour that should continue after the official end of the entire DDR programme. In addition, ex-combatants' unrealistic expectations about life after discharge – provoked by incorrect information campaigns – were not managed well by the implementing partners, who lacked reintegration skills and techniques.

These and other problems encountered during the DDR programme are impacting negatively on the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants. In addition, only minimal orientation activities (such as trauma healing and psycho-social counselling, information and sensitisation about the DDR programme and its package, life skills and civic education) were provided for the ex-combatants, due to the very limited time frames provided for demobilisation and reintegration. Furthermore, minimal sensitisation was undertaken in the receiving communities to prepare for the return of ex-combatants. This has resulted in many problems arising between these two groups, as the community members perceive the ex-combatants as responsible for their suffering. As the ex-combatants return to resettle, they are faced with this resentment.

Rural and Urban Reintegration

With the return of ex-combatants and other war-affected groups to the communities, access to land is now an extremely important issue. For women in particular, land inheritance traditions exclude them from ownership. Also, it is almost impossible for people from the city to own land in rural areas, and it is beyond the scope of the DDR programme to reform constitutional, customary and statutory laws to guarantee ex-combatants' access to land. The strides made by women (especially after the enactment of the gender bills) and people from the city to possess land in the provinces, compounded by the numerous land disputes that have erupted as ex-combatants return to repossess their lands, are challenges faced by the local authorities. The ability to resolve such disputes should be informed by resettlement and reintegration policies, especially in

order to handle the retaliation tendencies of community members. The community members tend to be of the view that people coming from the city to settle in the provinces are all ex-combatants, who likely have lifestyles that are 'inhuman', and it would be difficult to cope with their presence. A community member revealed:

"We have forgiven them (ex-combatants) but it is extremely impossible to forget. Their behavior reminds us of their evil ways and we tend to deny them community privileges which stand as obstacles to their reintegration."³

The ex-combatants' reinsertion benefits are perceived by other community members as rewarding perpetrators of violence and atrocities, rather than an investment in peace and reconciliation. This often adds to the tensions between community members and ex-combatants. Ex-combatants' difficulties in reintegrating into rural village life have resulted in their influx into the capital city and big towns, where they are facing accommodation problems. Many have entered slums, where the degrading conditions do not offer many opportunities for reintegration.

Reintegration of Youth

Children, young persons and young adults fall within the category of youth (18-35 years). For both boys and girls, categorised as youth, the DDR approach was largely inappropriate. Ex-combatants under 18 years of age were regarded as child soldiers and were treated as children, not taking into account the extended responsibilities that many of these young people have as providers. Those just above the age of 18 years were treated as adults, in programmes with a 'livelihood focus', which neglect young people's needs for 'catch-up' education programmes and their ambition for careers and better futures. The specific nature of this group is that they are neither children nor adults, but have distinct characteristics as a result of their in-between status and the experiences they have been through.

This group, classified as 'youth', accounts for more than 50% of the population of Sierra Leone. The population of ex-combatants, who are mainly youth themselves, have joined this larger and more powerful group. Ex-combatants are no longer considered a special group with special concerns and needs, but as part of the working population, responsible for their individual development and the larger national develop-

ment. However, their low skills capacity makes it almost impossible for many of these young people to be part of reconstruction and mainstream programmes carried out by service providers, which would build their self-esteem and status. One such programme is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Youth Engagement Programme, which involves broad collaboration with the Ministry of Youth and Sports in supporting the implementation of the National Youth Policy. This is done through capacity-building and advocacy for youth activities in the communities, under the Reintegration and Transition to Peacebuilding Programme.⁴

Even when there are efforts to engage these young people in decent employment and activities, their lack of education and skills impede them from benefiting from whatever is made available to them. Many are idle youth, who failed to pursue education or learn a skill that would contribute to the development of the nation and serve as their source of income. This is significant, as the unemployed youth resort to their arms and weapons to provide them with the illusion of power and importance and to generate both recognition and remuneration, contributing to further 'insecurity'. In this way, conflicts provide 'employment' for many young people (including the large number of child soldiers and the so-called 'war entrepreneurs'), who choose to be engaged in unlawful income-generating activities during such situations. Youth unemployment is, therefore, increasingly considered not only as a socio-economic issue but also as a political and security issue, posing a serious obstacle to peace, security and development in Sierra Leone.

Psycho-Social Problems

Many ex-combatants are suffering from mental health problems. War trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) affect their physical, mental, emotional, behavioural and social abilities – that is, all aspects of their functioning. They are unable to come to terms with their past, and find it very difficult to reintegrate into society carrying their emotional and psychological baggage.

The minimal therapy and trauma counselling that was provided for ex-combatants, and the unavailability of established counselling centres with both trained psychotherapists and counsellors, have resulted in an increase in the number of ex-combatants and war-affected people suffering from PTSD. Many have

since lost their jobs, because they are unable to behave 'normally' in their places of work and among people.

Women and Girls' Concerns

The social acceptance and economic reintegration of many female ex-combatants is impeded by health and psychosocial problems associated with the stigma of forced sexual activities, childbirth, abortion and having been fighters. Carrying children of rape, or being abandoned by their 'bush husbands', makes it difficult for female ex-combatants to cope with life – especially when they lack education, skills and a means of livelihood. Many have also developed varying degrees of attachment to their commanders. Some of these relationships resemble those of families in the traditional sense, while others are based on a strong loyalty built in combat. Some women were simply abducted, then abandoned. These women have suffered the most abuse and poor health, and have very limited prospects for the future. Many women were even unable to access the reintegration opportunities provided, because they lacked the time and supplementary financial means to attend the training courses that should have ameliorated their living conditions.

There are many other women involved in combat who, because of the 'possession of arms' criteria for entering into the DDR programme, were excluded from the benefits and opportunities of reintegration. They were left to find their own way through life, and are suffering triple discrimination – as women, ex-combatants and the poor. Those who do survive still find it very difficult to proceed with life in the expected traditional women's roles, which are opposed to the more powerful combat roles they held during the conflict. Reintegration programmes have failed to address these multiple challenges facing women.

Family Reunification

Many children associated with the fighting forces lost their parents and relatives during the conflict, and now have no-one to take care of them. For those whose parents survived, their deplorable conditions prevent them from taking care of their children. On the other hand, some children are still not willing to go home, because they ran away from home as a result of the physical and sexual abuse to which they were subjected. For those children desperate to be reunited with their families and return home, it has been difficult for the

THE EX-COMBATANTS' REINSERTION BENEFITS ARE PERCEIVED BY OTHER COMMUNITY MEMBERS AS REWARDING PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE AND ATROCITIES, RATHER THAN AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE AND RECONCILIATION



A member of the Freetown Single Limb Amputee football team practises in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Nearly all the players were victims of Sierra Leone's brutal civil war.

UNICEF, the Sierra Leone Red Cross Society (SLRCS), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organisations helping children, to unify them with their families through their tracing and family reunification programmes.

Some of these children were placed into the formal education system, but have dropped out because they were not given scholarships to cover their entire schooling. Others who were provided with skills training opportunities – without proper monitoring of their commitment and progress – are now goods-carriers in the markets, mini bus (*poda poda*) apprentices and involved in other such meagre jobs and activities for their daily survival. An interview with one such child revealed:

“I want to go to school but I don't have someone who will pay my fees, the money I get is insufficient to upkeep me, not to talk of paying fees.”⁵

Imprisoned Ex-Combatants

There are some ex-combatants imprisoned at the Pademba Road Maximum Prison in Freetown, for

so-called ‘security’ reasons. They have been denied the opportunity to be part of the reintegration component of the DDR programme. These ex-combatants need to be released and reintegrated into their preferred community of settlement. They should be counselled and provided with civic education, life skills and education to foster their gainful employment into decent work and activities. The alternative is that they will be easy recruits for criminal activities upon their release, and further contribute to insecurity and instability. A recently released inmate indicated in an interview:

“It is very disheartening to spare some people ... leaving others to suffer. There is no country in the whole world where peace, love and unity shall hold firmly without equal rights and justice”.⁶

Due to a lack of political will, the past government failed to release all imprisoned ex-combatants, and paid minimal attention to them and the human rights abuses they faced. This was a contributing factor for some of the violence that ensued during and after the recently



A main reintegration goal, in Sierra Leone, was to assist ex-combatants to become productive members of their communities.

concluded elections by sympathisers on the outside, who were mainly ex-combatants and ex-servicemen. Imprisoned ex-combatants remain a threat to peace and security, even as inmates, as the Maximum Prison is a recruitment target for insurgents whenever there is an uprising. There is a dire need for the new government to address this neglected group and issue.

Skills and Vocational Training

The NCDDR was faced with the problems of limited funds and facilities available for the reintegration of the large number of ex-combatants who had completed the disarmament and demobilisation phase, due to the lack of consistent funding through the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and the capacity of implementing partners. This resulted in the delivery of only short-term training opportunities, without many apprenticeships or on-the-job training in existing workshops or businesses. Also, the vocational trainings that were offered by the NCDDR focused on carpentry, masonry, hairdressing, tailoring, metal works and so on, but there are limited employment opportunities for such trades.⁷

Apprenticeships or on-the-job training should have been an excellent means of social reintegration and reconciliation, as they offer insertion through association with a mentor or trainer into an already existing

socio-economic network, consisting of groups and communities of people who are not ex-combatants. This should have resulted in more sustainable employment and reintegration. However, the lack of education and the training coordination capacity, the lack of official accreditation of the certificates and qualifications attained, the shortage of well-experienced trainers, and trainers who used rigid, instructor-oriented methodologies, turned the training into quick-fix endeavours with little impact. A staff member of one of the implementing institutions said in an interview:

“...we told them they will become carpenters, hairdressers, mechanics even though we knew it was almost impossible because the short trainings provided was insufficient for them to be able to compete with the well-trained and experienced professionals of these trades.”⁸

Without any significant access to micro-credit schemes and few job opportunities, the skills development training has lost its potential value to ex-combatants. Many used their reinsertion benefits to buy basic diamond mining equipment, and are presently in the Kono District mining for diamonds.⁹ Others bought motorbikes and are running them on a commercial basis.

Those who squandered all they were given are now in a deplorable and frustrating situation, with little or no hope. They believe that they did not achieve anything from the war or the DDR programme.

Summary and Conclusion

One of the most complex challenges of post-conflict reintegration in Sierra Leone is that proper and comprehensive socio-economic profiling, opportunity mapping and labour market analyses were not undertaken to provide information and balance the needs and ambitions of ex-combatants, the needs and expectations of receiving communities and, most importantly, the potential and limitations of the market and economy. Also, the reintegration component of the DDR programme was not closely linked with broader socio-economic recovery and reconstruction processes.


The incorporation of reintegration actors such as relief and development agencies, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based organisations (CBOs) on the ground in the different communities, would have ensured not only the sustainability of reintegration schemes for ex-combatants, but also the economic impact of such initiatives (for example, employment creation, vocational training, micro-credits and so on). This could have contributed to the broader process of economic revitalisation, by building a bridge between post-conflict recovery and sustainable development. Integrating reintegration with the broader plan for socio-economic recovery and reconstruction would have harnessed the important economic multiplier effects and capacities it generates to the wider goals of development. Also, extra efforts by the government to build the capacity of the ministries responsible for employment and youth would have enabled them to provide jobs for ex-combatants, rather than leaving the burden on INGOs, NGOs and CBOs alone.

The ability to meet these and other numerous challenges will ultimately determine whether or not Sierra Leone is destined to become a permanent breeding ground for war, chaos and illegal commercial activity, or whether it is destined for a far more peaceful future that may be compared to post-conflict Namibia or Mozambique. Sierra Leone is a litmus test for the United Nations' (UN) re-engagement in Peace Support Operations, and for its determination to do things better, based on lessons learnt.¹⁰

The government's willingness and support is very crucial to achieving sustainable reintegration, peace and development. Although this has been manifested by the past government, the dynamics of politics and their self-interests did not allow its full and ultimate realisation. Many people are wondering whether this

new government will exercise much commitment to post-conflict reintegration as a long-term process that should continue, even though the DDR programme is said to have been completed.

The new administration needs to expand in a rapid manner – the pace, scope and scale of national recovery activities, led by government agencies such as the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), and the complementary activities and programmes of the ministries (for instance, the Institutional Reform and Capacity-Building Project, implemented by the Decentralisation Secretariat under the Ministry of Local Government), in order to sustain the gains made thus far.

Key DDR actors and stakeholders need to examine these challenges and other lessons learnt, so that these issues can be addressed in future peace support operations. Reintegration must move beyond just getting ex-combatants back to their pre-war status and positions, as this renders them easy prey for combat re-recruitment and reinforces ethnic and gender-related inequalities. Changing and improving ex-combatants' status and situations will inevitably guarantee the more successful reintegration necessary for sustainable peace and development. 

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SUDAN FACT-FILE

BY WALTER LOTZE

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Since gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has been in a near-constant state of civil war, save for a 10-year period between 1972 and 1983. Whilst the conflict between northern and southern Sudan has dominated Sudan's 50-odd years of independence, the emergence of conflicts in Darfur and eastern Sudan in recent years have served to underline the history of internal conflict, which has characterised the country since decolonisation. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 brought to an end the north-south conflict (Africa's longest-running civil war), and the signing of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) in 2006 brought a measure of stability to Sudan's eastern regions. The conflict in Darfur, however, continues unabated.

Efforts to implement the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) are ongoing, and negotiations for a more inclusive peace agreement for Darfur are underway. As Sudan faces multiple conflicts with varied causes, various peace agreements and approaches to peacemaking and peace-building are required.



REUTERS / THE BIGGER PICTURE

Above: Soldiers from the UNAMID peacekeeping force guard a supply convoy leaving El Fasher in Sudan's Darfur region.

Below: Displaced Sudanese women wait at a food distribution centre in a refugee camp in northern Darfur.



REUTERS / THE BIGGER PICTURE



Below: A displaced Sudanese woman grinds meal at the Sakali Displaced Persons camp in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur state.



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A senior United Nations police advisor speaks through an interpreter to traditional leaders at the Abu Shouk camp for internally displaced people on the outskirts of El Fasher, the administrative capital of North Darfur.

PEACEBUILDING

Various actors and stakeholders are engaged in peacebuilding activities in Sudan. This situation is complicated by the political and operational realities of the country: multiple overlapping conflicts being dealt with by numerous political structures with separate mandates, and a host of organisations operating across the conflict spectrum – from conflict prevention to conflict transformation. Therefore, peacebuilding efforts in Sudan are faced with the challenge of addressing these overlapping conflicts with overlapping responses. It is for this reason that, at present, numerous peacekeeping operations are underway in Sudan.

PEACEKEEPING MISSION

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SUDAN (UNMIS)

Duration	March 2005 to date					
Strength	Military Component		Police Component		Civilian Component	
	Mandate	10 000	Mandate	715	Mandate	–
	Actual	9 399	Actual	652	Actual	3 703
Location	Sudan					
Headquarters	Khartoum					
Fatalities	25 (9 military, 1 military observer, 2 police, 4 international civilians, 9 national civilians)					
Budget	1 July 2007 – 30 June 2008 : US\$ 887 332 000					

MANDATE

- 1 To support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA);
- 2 To facilitate and coordinate, within capabilities and areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions; and
- 3 To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including IDPs, returning refugees and women and children, within UNMIS's capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations (UN) agencies, related organisations and non-governmental organisations.

A guard stands on the roof of the United Nations Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) in Khartoum as the United Nations Security Council meets inside during their fact finding mission regarding the situation in Darfur, in June 2006.



PEACEKEEPING MISSION

UNITED NATIONS – AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID)

Duration	Authorised 31 July 2007. Commenced 31 December 2007					
Strength	Military Component		Police Component		Civilian Component	
	Mandate	19 555	Mandate	6 432	Mandate	–
	Actual	–	Actual	227	Actual	63
Location	Darfur					
Headquarters	Khartoum and El Fasher					
Fatalities	–					
Budget	US\$ 1 477 766 (Includes support account for peacekeeping operations and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy)					

MANDATE (As set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007)

- 1 To contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision of humanitarian assistance, and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur;
- 2 To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;
- 3 To monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of various ceasefire agreements signed since 2004, as well as to assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements;
- 4 To assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the African Union – United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process;
- 5 To contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development, as well as the sustainable return of IDPs and refugees;
- 6 To contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Darfur;
- 7 To assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the development and consolidation of the legal framework, in consultation with relevant Sudanese authorities; and
- 8 To monitor and report on the security situation at Sudan’s borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.



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The joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force replaced the previous under-funded and ill-equipped African Union force in Darfur, Sudan.

CHALLENGES TO PEACE

THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICT

The CPA that ended the north-south conflict has faced numerous difficulties relating to its implementation. Notably, aspects of the CPA relating to force redeployment, wealth sharing and power sharing under the Government of National Unity (GNU) created by the CPA have not been implemented to the satisfaction of the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Recently, the SPLM withdrew from the GNU, citing the lack of implementation of the CPA as a primary concern.

Further elements of the CPA – such as the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and broad Security Sector Reform (SSR) – remain to be implemented. The upward pressure placed on land, grazing, water and food resources by increasing volumes of returnees pose further threats to the development of sustainable peace in southern Sudan.

Outstanding contentious issues that have the potential to threaten the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts in southern Sudan include the holding of a national census, national elections in 2009, and a referendum on the future status of southern Sudan in 2011.

OTHER CONFLICT ISSUES

The implementation of the ESPA, which brought an end to much of the violence in eastern Sudan, remains fraught with difficulties. In Abyei, the difficulties faced with establishing the Abyei Boundary Commission, and the lack of boundary demarcation, pose additional threats to the creation of sustainable peace in Sudan.

The active involvement in Sudan's conflicts, and support provided to belligerent groups, by neighbouring countries continues to hamper the various peace processes underway.

DARFUR

The failure of the DPA, and efforts aimed at its implementation, have led to a new round of peace negotiations being hosted in Sirte, Libya, aimed at resolving the conflict. The refusal of several warring factions to attend the negotiations, and the exclusion of the Janjaweed, a militia group at the centre of the Darfur conflict, undermine the value of these negotiations.

Further challenges to the attainment of peace in Darfur include the establishment of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) mechanism, peacebuilding measures included in the DPA and aimed at resolving conflicts at local and regional levels. To date, these mechanisms do not function.

Should no new peace agreement be negotiated, the DPA envisions that elections will be held in Darfur in 2008, and a referendum on the governance of Darfur will be held in 2009. The election and referendum remain contentious, as the DPA is not widely supported, and was signed only by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), led by Mini Winawi. As elections and the demarcation of boundaries have the potential to shift power structures and are at present not widely supported, pushing ahead with elections and the referendum could further entrench divisions among factions in Darfur.

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US INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING

WRITTEN BY **KENNETH MPYISI**



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The announcement by President George Bush on 7 February 2007, that he had directed his Department of Defense (DoD) to develop and establish a Unified Command for Africa (AFRICOM) by the end of September 2008, generated excitement and concern within the continent. So far, the debate on whether AFRICOM is a viable project for the continent has been animated by two schools of thought: outright rejection and cautious optimism. As important as these views may be, the purpose of this article is not to engage on the correctness of these two arguments but rather to contribute to this debate, by focusing on the process and previous programmes that paved the way for AFRICOM, and to question whether it is in keeping with the basic principles that underline the African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA). Through understanding the Global

Above: By providing peacekeeping training and equipment the US hopes to preclude its need to intervene militarily in Africa.

Peace Operation Initiative and other programmes, this article places AFRICOM as the residue of United States (US) historical involvement on the continent.

AFRICOM

Until recently, Africa was of no strategic interest to the US. During the Cold War, the strategic importance of African countries was calculated in terms of lessening the presence of the Soviet Union. However, with the end of the Cold War and the escalation of conflict in Africa, the continent was perceived by the US as ground for the spread of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.

The debate on AFRICOM's added value to the APSA is represented by two views. The first argument is not on the form of AFRICOM, but rather on its motive and timing. Consequently, the proponents of this view are interested in questions about why the need for AFRICOM, and why now? They insist that AFRICOM is not only a smack on the continent's sovereignty, but an attempt by the US to secure its own economic interests. This

argument is firmly grounded on the increased strategic importance of Africa for the US. For example, African oil exports will account for 25% of total US oil imports by 2015. This is a good enough reason for the US to secure African oilfields, considering the political and economic costs of importing oil from the Middle East.

The academic justification for AFRICOM can be found in expanding literature on the concept of failed and failing states.¹ This literature argues that some African states lost the empirical meaning of statehood when they increasingly lost the monopoly of exercising legitimate force or state power over their national territory, becoming safe havens for terrorists. As a policy response, these states require international support to reconstitute their capacity to exercise the monopoly of legitimate use of force over their territory. AFRICOM should, therefore, be viewed as an initiative aimed at reconstituting failed states in Africa – or at least aimed at enhancing the capacity of failing states. However, it should be noted that the African Union (AU) has developed a comprehensive and integrated policy, which seeks to address issues of post-conflict reconstruction and development on the continent. The question that then comes to mind is: how does AFRICOM fit into this AU policy and the basic principles underlying it?

Another argument states that any outright rejection of AFRICOM would not be wise, considering the inability of Africa to respond to and sustain some of its peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. As a consequence, the continent should rather engage AFRICOM in a constructive manner that addresses the security concerns of both the US and Africa. This argument does not reject the increase in US interest in Africa; rather, it is considered a necessary but not sufficient factor in informing AFRICOM. Since the US's overriding concern is security – which does not always coincide with African security concerns – Africa can benefit from AFRICOM if the two parties can only harmonise their interests. Such engagement could redirect AFRICOM from an obsession with the war on terrorism towards training and other support for the continent's own security operations, such as those envisioned for the Africa Standby Force.

Amidst concern and excitement about AFRICOM, there is the lack of a concerted and unified response from the continent. However, there are attempts by the US to exploit this lack of cohesion by trying to win some African states individually, while some have already shown their willingness to cooperate. Considering that the AU is the custodian of peace and security on the

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The US's strategic interests in securing Africa's oil is a major reason for the country's involvement in African peacekeeping.



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Former US president, Bill Clinton, and his administration pursued and launched the African Crisis Response Initiative in September 1996.

continent, should it provide the first venue for the US in any discussion on peace and security on the continent? If the US is genuinely interested in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, then it should have sought the consent of the AU Peace and Security Council formally, before approaching member states. How does the US conceive or regard the AU Policy Framework on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development? Perhaps the US understands that it is unlikely to receive the AU's approval and that, in addition, it cannot offer security for the entire continent in order to ensure its buy-in. As a consequence, the individual approach that has worked so well in the past has been reincarnated

US Efforts to Support African Peacekeeping

The African Crisis Response Initiative

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was launched in September 1996 by the American Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, with the objective of helping to develop African countries' capacity to maintain peace and order on the continent. ACRI's establishment tactically acknowledges the fact that the US is unlikely to intervene in armed conflicts on the African continent. Indeed, the impetus behind the programme was to plan a quick-fix response to the anticipated bloodbath in Burundi, and to neutralise the

possibility of deploying its own troops². Therefore, the interests of the US – to minimise the costs of paying a high 'human price' in peacekeeping operations and other humanitarian interventions in Africa – encouraged the Clinton administration to pursue the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF).

The first version of the ACRI was presented in 1996, with the idea of setting up an inter-African peacekeeping force. The ACRI programme was meant to function for four years (1997-2001). The programme focused on traditional (classic) peacekeeping missions such as convoy escort communications and logistics, rather than more complex missions. The supposed output of ACRI consisted of 10 000 African servicemen who were led by African commanders, deployed under the banner of the United Nations (UN), but equipped and financed by the US and other donors.³

The programme produced a mixed reception in Africa. Initially, African countries were not enthusiastic about ACRI, as it was unclear how African states would participate in implementing the programme. However, after some months, African countries seemed to favour the ACRI programme, as they envisioned benefiting and playing a major role in its activities.

All in all, the ACRI project was a manifestation of the idea expressed by American strategists of subcontracting international problems to the regional actors

concerned about instability. Some observers worried about the viability of ACRI, as some African countries could have used the training and security assistance provided by the US negatively, to influence domestic political outcomes.

The African Contingency Operations Training Assistance

The African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) programme is the continuation of the ACRI programme. Peace enforcement training, which was not included under ACRI, was added to the ACOTA format.

- The ACOTA programme has five main objectives:
- to train and equip African militaries to respond to peace support and complex humanitarian requirements;
 - to build and enhance a sustainable African peace support training capacity;
 - to build effective command and control;
 - to promote communality and interoperability; and
 - to enhance international, regional and sub-regional peace support capacity in Africa.

The ACOTA programme employs the Programme of Instruction (POI), which is a collection of training modules

sanctioned by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Each partner country selects a course of instruction based on its specific capabilities and needs. On the request of a recipient country, lethal training may even be delivered. Moreover, under ACOTA, instructions on the role of non-governmental and international organisations in peace operations are provided. The programme makes use of a train-the-trainer methodology. ACOTA also has a programme for countries that are in need of immediate pre-deployment training.

The ACOTA programme enjoys the highest profile of all US-Africa military assistance arrangements. ACOTA has trained over 17 000 African troops from 10 countries, with an annual budget of \$15 million. Most of the original ACRI recipients have continued to participate in the ACOTA programme, except those who are withdrawn because of domestic unrest and external military involvement.

The Global Peace Operation Initiative

In June 2004, at the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, the US and other G8 countries approved the Global Peace Operation Initiative (GPOI) to enhance the world's capacity to deal with post-conflict situations, especially in Africa. The initiative intended to address the gap between the demand for trained peacekeeping missions

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Peace enforcement training is a major focus of the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Programme.

and their inadequate availability, especially for missions in Africa. US president George Bush stated that GPOI is “the more effective means to stabilize regions in terms of oil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing”.⁴

The primary purposes of the GPOI are:

- to train and equip 75 000 military troops – the majority of them African – in peacekeeping skills by 2010;
- to support the Italian-based training institution for international constabulary forces to participate in peacekeeping missions; and
- to promote an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.

Furthermore, GPOI encourages the exchange of information to improve international coordination on peace operations, training and exercises in Africa. The US planned to contribute about \$660 million over five years (2005-2009) towards the initiative, and promised to approach the G8 countries for possible contributions.⁵ The GPOI, as a programme, also strives to enhance and support the command structure and multilateral staff of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU, within the greater spectrum of encouraging peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. The

The rationale behind initiatives such as GPOI is associated with reducing or avoiding the direct involvement of US troops in African peacekeeping operations. By providing peacekeeping training, instruction and equipment, the US hopes to preclude its need to intervene militarily in Africa. Despite its stated objective, GPOI and its various programmes are designed to boost the US position in Africa, for the purpose of securing energy – the US has become increasingly interested in Africa for its oil. In 2003, a senior Pentagon official revealed to a *Wall Street Journal* journalist that “a key mission for US forces in Africa would be to ensure that Nigeria’s oil fields, which in the future could account for as much as 25 percent of all US oil imports, are secure”.⁷ Experts predict that oil imports from Africa could surpass those from the Persian Gulf by 2010. Therefore, the US is interested in strengthening its ties to oil-producing African governments and promoting peace in these countries, as continued instability could jeopardise the supply of oil.

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US brought about a significant shift in the international political landscape. The US foreign policy is now heavily focused on fighting global terrorism, and its interests in building the peacekeeping capacity of African nations is likely related to the post-9/11 belief that failed states are

THE US IS INTERESTED IN STRENGTHENING ITS TIES TO OIL-PRODUCING AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS AND PROMOTING PEACE IN THESE COUNTRIES, AS CONTINUED INSTABILITY COULD JEOPARDISE THE SUPPLY OF OIL

previous ACOTA programme was also subsumed under the GPOI.

Starting from fiscal year 2006, US funds for peacekeeping training in Africa are now being channeled primarily through the GPOI, which incorporates the ACOTA and other US funds. In 2007, ACOTA planned to train and equip new battalions and special units in partner countries such as Senegal, Benin, Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa. The ACOTA programme may also expand to new partner countries, such as Angola and Namibia.⁶

The other goal of GPOI has been extending support for Italy to establish a centre to train international *gendarme* (constabulary) forces. The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) was inaugurated in March 2005 at Vicenza. CoESPU’s goal is to train 3 000 mid- to high-ranking personnel and an additional 4 000 uniformed units in their home countries by 2010, to meet the needs of peace support operations.

ideal training, staging and breeding grounds for international terrorists. According to Okumu, “improvement of African security would inevitably promote US national interests by making it less likely that the continent could be a source of terrorism against the United States.”⁸

The Role of GPOI in Promoting Peacekeeping in Africa

The GPOI was initially designed as a mechanism to contain conflicts throughout Africa and the world. The initiative is different in approach from previous programmes, since it focuses on building the capacity of states rather than deploying its own forces to mitigate devastating conflicts. The provision of peacekeeping training by the US under different initiatives has positively impacted on the quality of peacekeeping operations delivered by African countries. For instance, Senegal, Ethiopia, Ghana, Benin, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda and Nigeria are recipients of ACOTA or other forms of military training, and they are also contributing

ANY OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF AFRICOM WOULD NOT BE WISE, CONSIDERING THE INABILITY OF AFRICA TO RESPOND TO AND SUSTAIN SOME OF ITS PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING MISSIONS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE CONTINENT SHOULD RATHER ENGAGE AFRICOM IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER THAT ADDRESSES THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF BOTH THE US AND AFRICA

the majority of troops for peacekeeping missions undertaken in Africa under the banner of ECOWAS, the AU and the UN.⁹ ACOTA's programme of helping countries that are in need of immediate pre-deployment training contributed significantly to the success of peacekeeping operations, such as that in Burundi.

However, most peacekeeping missions have failed because of the lack of basic logistical resources. The GPOI has offered resources such as training and military hardware, which will have a greater impact in alleviating some of the logistical problems. Even if many in Africa are sceptical about the real motive behind GPOI, the programme seems to be instrumental in raising the capability of African states to face complex humanitarian emergencies by themselves, in line with the continent's objective of finding African solutions to African problems.

The GPOI and other previous US initiatives have been criticised for concentrating on military training and, to a lesser extent, training *gendarmierie*. The question of whether to focus on military developments only or the full range of tasks necessary for peacekeeping, is at the centre of the criticisms. The US's willingness to deploy forces has been overshadowed by its inability to provide logistical support and basic field equipment such as field lodgings, mess facilities and medical facilities. In order to consolidate the capacity of African states genuinely, the provision of peacekeeping equipment is a crucial component.

Conclusion

US involvement in African peacekeeping has evolved from initial indirect support to a now more visible approach. However, there is no doubt that US involvement in African peacekeeping is still informed by the strategic quest for energy security, and advancing the war against terrorism within the context of national security. AFRICOM symbolises the epitome of US interest on the African continent, even if a more visible approach could expose US personnel and troops to terrorist attacks. By not fully engaging the AU as the custodian of peace and security on the continent, the US could be perceived to be undermining the African states' efforts at enhancing the African peace and security on the continent. There is no

doubt that the AU has made strides in addressing instability on the continent, through the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture. If the US genuinely wishes to ensure the long-term stability of Africa, it should ensure full support for endogenous initiatives by supporting the African peace and security architecture and, in particular, the African Standby Force. 🇺🇸

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MONUC AND POST-ELECTORAL CHALLENGES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

WRITTEN BY **GUSTAVO DE CARVALHO**

As democracy is a process and not merely an event, elections in themselves will not ensure democracy. Without elections, however, which are events that punctuate the democratic process, a country is unlikely to become a democracy.¹

William Swing, Special Representative of the Secretary General for the DRC.

This quote depicts the nature of the challenges faced by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) today. In its current post-electoral period, the DRC faces a contradictory and uncertain future. On the one hand, there are reasons for optimism, as the country was able to hold free elections in 2006 – an accomplishment that many would find difficult, due to the constant changes in the country’s political and social environment and frequent postponement of the ballots. On the other hand,

even with the presence of an elected government, the situation remains volatile in many regions of the country, especially in the east.

Above: Congolese children walk past Bangladeshi United Nations peacekeepers in armoured personnel carriers in the DRC’s Ituri district.

One inference that supports the arguments in this article is that establishing peace in the DRC needs to go beyond the occurrence of democratic elections. According to Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, the occurrence of elections in post-conflict societies can be a misleading signal of calm, as there is no systematic influence between the holding of elections and a decrease in the risk of war.² While in the specific year that the elections are to occur, there may be a reduction of the risk of violence, in the year after the elections are held, there is a tendency for violence to flare up again.³ This argument is confirmed by the evolution of events in the DRC since the 2006 elections.

After many postponements, the electoral process in 2006 occurred without major problems. In March 2007, however, John-Pierre Bemba's and Joseph Kabila's supporters fought in the streets of Kinshasa.⁴ This was followed by the exile of Bemba to Portugal, and his refusal to return to the DRC, alleging a lack of security if he returned to Kinshasa. The province of North Kivu still faces conflict between the emerging rebel forces, led by the former general Laurent Nkunda, and the Congolese army. Similarly, South Kivu and the district of Ituri have also witnessed clashes amongst armed militias, as well as between armed groups and the army.

All of these incidents are examples of the complexities and quick changes the country has faced, and still continues to face. It also confirms that the holding of elections was not enough to put the country on the path to lasting and sustainable peace. The question that therefore remains is: what challenges need to be overcome in order to guarantee a successful post-electoral environment in the DRC?

Most importantly, a post-conflict country requires the establishment of a secure environment and the assurance of economic recovery.⁵ The government needs to take the lead in the peacebuilding process, by strengthening the services it offers to the population, acquiring more governmental and administrative efficiency, and providing a stable and inclusive environment that allows for the reconstruction of the country. For countries like the DRC, however, it is extremely difficult for the government to assume such responsibility in the aftermath of war and conflict. The government of the DRC is extremely weak and lacks the ability and capacity for political presence in all areas of a large country. The high levels of corruption within the government also undermine its effectiveness and ability to provide a secure environment, in which economic recovery can occur.⁶

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MONUC members display 18 anti-tank mines that they removed from a bridge in Kisangani, in 2000.

A POST-CONFLICT COUNTRY REQUIRES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ASSURANCE OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY

In this regard, the presence of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) is pivotal in supporting the government, and the country, in the post-conflict and consequently post-electoral context. In supporting the government in the creation of a secure and stable social and political environment, MONUC enables the provision of activities (in support of economic recovery) from the government and other actors, such as United Nations (UN) agencies or local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

This article highlights the role that MONUC has played in the DRC, and outlines the challenges that it will have to overcome in order to support the country's peacebuilding process.

Evolution of MONUC's Scope

Many international actors have been instrumental in supporting the DRC peace process and the holding of elections. MONUC had a very important role during the transitional process that culminated in the holding of elections in the DRC. The mission had a crucial role in supporting coordination and planning for the elections, rendering elections in the DRC the biggest electoral process ever supported by the UN.

Since its establishment in 1999, MONUC has adapted many times following the political and social evolution in the DRC. When MONUC started, it was conceived as a traditional peacekeeping operation, in which military observers were deployed with the aim of monitoring and supporting the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In the course of the years, it was recognised that the use of military observers was not enough to guarantee the safety of the country. The mission was, therefore, given the right to use force to implement its mandate, which included support in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, support in humanitarian aid and the protection of civilians, amongst others. With the signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement in 2003, one of the most important pillars of the mission's mandate was support to the transitional process that led to elections in the DRC.

Such a robust approach has been characteristic of MONUC's role and scope in the country, particularly vis-à-vis supporting stability in the DRC from the transitional process to elections, the latter of which was also supported by European Union Forces based in Kinshasa. MONUC's presence facilitated a relatively orderly process towards the election of a legitimate government.

After the elections, a new mandate was established

for MONUC, and approved by the UN Security Council (UNSC). An analysis of this mandate shows that, in the post-electoral period, MONUC's focus would still remain on the support of a secure and stable environment, which would necessitate then that MONUC maintain its robust military approach. As with the previous mandate, the new mandate bestowed huge responsibilities on the mission – all related to ensuing stability in the DRC – including the protection of civilians, ensuring territorial security, disarmament and demobilisation, and a Security Sector Reform (SSR) process.

MONUC's Mandate (UNSC Resolution 1756)

The approval of the UNSC Resolution 1756, on 15 May 2007, established a mandate based on the following pillars:

- Protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and UN personnel and facilities.
- Territorial security of the DRC.
- Disarmament and demobilisation of foreign and Congolese armed groups.
- Security Sector Reform.
- Support towards strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law in the DRC, in close cooperation with the Congolese authorities, the UN Country Team (UNCT) and donors.

In this mandate, however, two new important aspects were presented. The first concerned support towards strengthening democratic institutions in the DRC, recognising the challenges facing the country vis-à-vis the promotion of national dialogue, the organisation of local elections and the promotion of good governance.

Secondly, the resolution requested the UN to present a report stating an indicative timetable for the gradual drawdown of MONUC. It recognised the presence of an elected government, which substantiated a broader decrease in the size of the mission, allowing for the DRC government (as opposed to the international community) to assume a lead in the peacebuilding process.

The DRC's Security Challenges in the Post-Electoral Environment

As noted, there are many important challenges facing the DRC in its pursuit of security, economic

recovery and development. The situation in the east is still tense, civilians continue to be threatened, the army is not completely integrated, many local and foreign armed groups are still active and the government still lacks authority in many areas of the country. In this context, some of the main issues currently presenting in the DRC are highlighted in terms of the challenges they pose to MONUC, and to the peacebuilding process in general.

Protection of Civilians

One of the challenges present in the DRC in the post-electoral period is the protection of civilians, under imminent threat of physical violence. The occurrence of human rights abuses is still common in the country, through arbitrary executions, rape, robbing and the extortion of civilians. Most of these acts are believed to be caused by the Congolese army (FARDC), police and members of rebel groups fighting the government, especially in the eastern provinces such as Kivu.⁷

In order to address this situation, MONUC has created mechanisms to support the government in this area, not only through military presence but also through activities such as analysing, investigating and reporting cases of human rights abuses, and support

especially Rwanda and Uganda. Despite the fact that some achievements have been made in this area, such as the organisation of the Joint Commission of Defence Ministers⁹, these problems have not been completely eliminated, and the tension between the countries remains.

The flow of arms through the borders is also a big challenge. Continued violations of the arms embargo are still occurring in the country, including allegations of violations from MONUC's troops. The DRC government, as well as countries like Rwanda and Uganda, are also accused of undermining the embargo and supporting armed groups in the east of the country.¹⁰

With the situation deteriorating, MONUC extended the arms embargo in the country in August 2007. This decision highlights that the willingness to deal with the deteriorating situation does not ignore the need to work in cooperation with the elected government. This is also evident in the exemption of the arms embargo to those army and police units that have completed their integration, operate under a clear chain of command, and are in the process of integration outside the Kivus (North and South) and Ituri regions. The lifting of the arms embargo for the army will, therefore, depend on successful security sector reform in the country.

MONUC NEEDS TO ACT IN COORDINATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT, AND SHOULD PLAY A MORE PROACTIVE AND HARMONISING ROLE IN ADVISING ON DECENTRALISATION, AND AMELIORATING THE TENSION THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

for the protection of civilians, humanitarian and UN personnel. However, since many governmental actors are allegedly involved in human rights abuses, impunity becomes the logical outcome.

The protection cluster – one of the mechanisms created to improve coordination between the UNCT, MONUC and NGOs – was designed with the aim of supporting the sharing of information, and a decrease in the duplication of activities in protected areas. Despite the creation of this cluster, many recommendations are still not implemented. Many times there are problems with access to the population to conduct protection-related activities, or insufficient operational capacity, amongst other things.⁸

Territorial Security for the DRC

The presence of foreign groups in the DRC still poses a risk to the country's territorial security, and also increases tensions between the DRC and its neighbours,

Disarmament and Demobilisation of Foreign and Congolese Armed Groups

The continued activities of armed groups pose an important challenge to disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR) of foreign and Congolese armed groups. Many of these groups refuse to demobilise and integrate into the army, as with General Nkunda's group in North Kivu.¹¹

In this context, two major problems can be highlighted. First, the government's refusal to negotiate with some armed groups has made a successful DDR process more difficult to achieve. Second, it is believed that, despite its mandate, MONUC is struggling to play a more robust role in the east in order to deal with the peace process spoilers, such as the armed groups operating in the Kivus.

However, the DDR process is not completely problematic. Currently, the third phase of the DDR programme is being implemented in coordination with



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MONUC's doctors treat Congolese refugees who fled their homes due to violent militia fighting in the Ituri region of the DRC.

the government, NGOs, MONUC and UN agencies. Until September 2007, this DDR phase had demobilised 921 people – more than 60% of whom are part of voluntary demobilisation.¹²

Security Sector Reform

Complementary to the DDR process, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is even more problematic. It is still common for Congolese soldiers and police officers to use arbitrary and excessive force in all regions of the country, and impunity regarding these actions still prevails. Thus, the SSR process is faulty. There is no complete integration of the FARDC, the differences in roles between the police and military are not clearly defined, and the army and police still lack clear command and control structures.

All these problems are directly affected by the instability in some regions of the country. The refusal of General Nkunda and his renegade forces to be integrated into the army, for instance, shows the difficulties that the

government and MONUC have in supporting the creation of a unified and professional army structure. This lack of clear structure then allows such groups to use armed men as a means of achieving their political goals.

Support for the Strengthening of Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law

While there is the need to increase the government's role in ensuring stability in the country, the government still faces capacity-related challenges and has inefficient institutions at both the national and local levels, which hinder its ability to exercise control over the entire country. In this context, the strengthening of democracy and the rule of law in the country will have to ensure that democratic institutions work efficiently with local governance and civilian participation.¹³

Local elections and the resultant future-elected politicians will be critical, as their relationship with the central government will be essential for the success or failure of the peace process. A process of political

power decentralisation needs to be effected in the DRC.¹⁴ In this context, central and local government would work in a coordinated manner, in order to deal with state affairs.¹⁵ MONUC, therefore, needs to act in coordination with the government, and should play a more proactive and harmonising role in advising on decentralisation, and ameliorating the tension that exists between the national and provincial levels of government.

Conclusion

As it has been highlighted, there are still many challenges to be overcome in order to achieve a peaceful situation in the DRC. The difficulties and risks to the country are enormous. As Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom point out, there is a forty percent risk that conflict can return to a country within a decade of cessation.¹⁶

Given this, considering elections and the establishment of a legitimate government in the DRC as a milestone for the basis of MONUC's exit strategy can be misleading. There are no clear indications or guarantees at this point that the government has the ability to, on its own, implement the peacebuilding process. Rushing

the drawdown of the mission can ruin all the efforts and work undertaken thus far in support of a sustainable political and social situation in the DRC.

However, there remain many other challenges as well. Firstly, the financial constraints under which the UN functions are quite well understood. With the impending deployment of the new UN-African Mission in Darfur, much of the resources that have been channelled to missions such as MONUC may be redirected to the hybrid mission (UNAMID). This would add further pressure for MONUC to downsize prematurely.

Secondly, MONUC's legitimacy in the Congolese context is essential. In the past few years, MONUC has faced a number of scandals that served to undermine its credibility. From sexual abuse and exploitation to the smuggling of gold and other resources, such scandals affect the way that the mission is perceived by the local population, and might contribute to demands for a sooner-than-appropriate withdrawal of MONUC from the country. Also, although there is a huge dependence on MONUC's support to the DRC today, if the government believes that the gains of more freedom

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A Lendu militiaman hands over his weapon to a MONUC peacekeeper, at the UN disarmament post of Yambi in Bunia, DRC.

IN ORDER TO ALLOW MONUC TO SCALE DOWN, THERE IS A NEED TO CREATE BASIC SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS SYSTEMATICALLY AND INCREMENTALLY, AS A BASIS FOR DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE PEACE

of action in its own country are superior to the gains provided by the presence of the mission, it will also start pressuring the peacekeeping mission to leave.

In order to allow MONUC to scale down, there is a need to create basic security and institutional frameworks systematically and incrementally, as a basis for developing sustainable peace. Such a process will only succeed when the different actors present in the DRC work together in a coordinated manner. This requires that each of the actors should have a clear role in the political process, and there should be a focus on empowering and building the capacity of Congolese actors.

The concept of an 'integrated mission' being implemented by the UN in the DRC supports a shared responsibility approach. In different areas of the government, UN agencies, MONUC and NGOs are beginning to work together in a more coordinated manner. It is still far from the ideal, and institutional and financial constraints make it even more difficult.

What is the prognosis for the DRC in the next few years? This is probably the most difficult question to answer. The government needs to create a secure environment, through the finalisation of the DDR and SSR processes; to protect civilians effectively; to enforce territorial security and to create institutions that allow the state to be sustainable. This will likely be a long journey, but it needs to be supported by the international community through economic recovery and the establishment of a secure environment, while also allowing the country to take the lead in its own peacebuilding process. 

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- 8 Refugees International 'Democratic Republic of the Congo: Protection of Civilians in North Kivu Must Go Beyond Monitoring'. Available at <www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/10116/>. Accessed on 14 September 2007.
- 9 The commission brings together the defence ministers of the Great Lakes region to, amongst other things, monitor the security situation and build confidence amongst the respective countries.
- 10 For more information, see <www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=16134>.
- 11 General Nkunda's argument for refusing to demobilise is based on protecting his ethnic group (the Banyamurenge), which he has argued is being persecuted and marginalised by the government.
- 12 Data available at <www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=15337>. Accessed on 12 September 2007.
- 13 MONUC's Future in the DRC. Available at <www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1417&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=218140>. Accessed on 20 September 2007.
- 14 Decentralisation in the DRC is tied to a constitutional provision allowing provincial governments to retain forty percent of all taxes collected, whilst the remaining sixty percent goes to the national government. This has been problematic, however, as the national government still seeks to retain one hundred per cent of taxes. Thus, provincial governments have started to protest openly against these threats to hold all funds unilaterally. The national government's response is that there needs to be a 'law of implementation' before the constitutional provision can be enforced.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke & Söderbom, Måns. Op cit. p. 14.

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND LOCAL OWNERSHIP AS CRITICAL FACTORS IN THE COHERENCE AND COORDINATION OF PEACEBUILDING SYSTEMS

WRITTEN BY **CEDRIC DE CONING**

Peacebuilding Systems

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peacebuilding, which has to do with managing change.¹ The nexus between development, peace and security has become the central focus of the international conflict management debate², and peacebuilding is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which these peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law, human rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country level.³

For the purposes of this article, a complex peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction system is defined as a post-conflict⁴ intervention⁵ that provides for parallel, concurrent and interlinked short-, medium- and long-term activities⁶ that work to prevent disputes from escalating, or avoiding a relapse, into violent conflict by addressing both the immediate consequences and the root causes of a conflict system. The peacebuilding or post-conflict intervention starts when a ceasefire agreement or peace agreement, which calls upon the international community to support the peace process, enters into force. It typically progresses through three stages, namely a stabilisation phase, a transitional phase and a consolidation phase.⁷ The peacebuilding intervention ends when the host society has developed the capacity to manage and sustain its own peace process, without external support.

A complex peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction system requires a wide range of internal⁸ and external⁹ actors, including governments, civil society, the private sector and international agencies, to work together in a coherent and coordinated effort. These peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction agents undertake a broad range of activities that span the security, political, development, human rights,

humanitarian and rule of law dimensions.¹⁰ Collectively and cumulatively, these activities address both the causes and consequences of the conflict system, and build momentum over time that facilitates the transformation of the system, and increases its resilience to violent conflict and its ability to sustain peace. In the short term, the goals of peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction interventions are to assist the internal actors with stabilising the peace process and preventing a relapse into conflict, but the ultimate aim is to support them in transforming the causes of the conflict, and laying the foundations for social justice and sustainable peace and development.¹¹

Coherence and Coordination

The need for, and benefits of, improved coherence is widely accepted today in the international multilateral governance context. There is now broad consensus that inconsistent policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication, inefficient spending, a lower quality of service, difficulty in meeting goals and, ultimately, of a reduced capacity for delivery.¹² There is, however, a considerable gap between the degree to which the benefits of coherence are held to be self-evident and an operational reality. The lack of coherence among field activities in the humanitarian relief, development, political and security spheres have been well documented in a number of evaluation papers and studies.¹³

It is possible to distinguish between four elements of coherence¹⁴ in the peacebuilding context, namely:

- 1 agency coherence – that is, consistency¹⁵ among the policies and actions of an individual agency, including the internal consistency of a specific policy or programme;
- 2 whole-of-government coherence – that is, consistency among the policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country¹⁶;

THE PEACEBUILDING OR POST-CONFLICT INTERVENTION STARTS WHEN A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT OR PEACE AGREEMENT, WHICH CALLS UPON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUPPORT THE PEACE PROCESS, ENTERS INTO FORCE



The Red Cross, a disaster and humanitarian relief organisation, is usually a part of the peacebuilding system in conflict situations.

- 3 external coherence – that is, consistency among the policies pursued by the various external actors in a given country context (harmonisation¹⁷); and
- 4 internal and external coherence – that is, consistency between the policies of the internal and external actors in a given country context (alignment¹⁸). The degree to which a specific peacebuilding system can be assessed to be more, or less, coherent will be a factor of all four elements of coherence.

In this article, ‘coherence’ is understood as the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and security dimensions of a peacebuilding system towards common strategic objectives.¹⁹ It is important to recognise, however, that the dynamic and non-linear nature of complex systems means that coherence can never be fully attained.²⁰ It is possible, however, to distinguish between systems where there is less, or more, coherence. Coherence is thus about degree, not end states. When making such judgements about coherence, one should consider with care the balance that has been struck among the four elements of coherence, the transaction cost in terms of the time

and resources invested in coordination, as well as any unintended consequences that may have come about in the process.²¹

Coordination entails developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, the division of roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources.²² It should be recognised, however, that not all the agents in the system need to be engaged in all coordination activities. And those that are, do not need to be engaged at the same level of intensity. There will typically be a core network that is well connected, an intermediate group that is regularly connected, and a periphery that is infrequently connected, if at all. It is thus possible to accommodate a range of appropriate levels of coordination within one peacebuilding system.

The Logic of Coherence

A peacebuilding system consists of a large number of agents that, when viewed as a whole, can be seen to carry out a broad spectrum of activities that have a collective impact on the conflict system they are attempting to influence. These agents are independent in that they have the power to make decisions about the allocation of their own resources, but they are also interdependent, in that no single agency, network or sub-system can

achieve the ultimate goal of the peacebuilding system – addressing the root causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace – on its own.

Each agency independently undertakes activities that address specific facets of the conflict spectrum, but a collective (combined), cumulative (sustained over time) and complementary effect is needed to achieve the overall peacebuilding goal. The peacebuilding system consists of all of the agents that are necessary to achieve the overall peacebuilding goal. They are bound together because they have a common goal that they can only achieve together – that is, the system effect is brought about by their interdependence. The success of each individual activity is thus linked to the success of the total collective and cumulative effect of the overall undertaking.²³ It can be concluded that it would be logical for peacebuilding agents to coordinate their activities so as to ensure that they have an overall coherent impact on the host system.

The Need for a Clearly Articulated Overall Peacebuilding Strategy

The importance of an overall strategic process is widely recognised and accepted, but poorly applied in

practise. As the studies cited²⁴ have pointed out, however, the lack of a clearly articulated overall strategy is, in fact, a critical shortcoming in most past and contemporary peacebuilding systems. Without it, the various peacebuilding agents have no benchmark against which they can judge the degree to which they are coherent with the overall peacebuilding strategy.

A strategic framework should reflect a common understanding of the problem – that is, the root causes of the conflict and the more immediate triggers that have caused the outbreak of violent conflict, and that may be continuing to stress the peace process. It should be grounded in a shared long-term vision of the future path that the country or conflict system wishes to realise, and it should contain a clearly articulated multi-dimensional and integrated strategy for the short-to medium-term future direction of the peace process. A strategic framework is not an operational and tactical implementation plan. Strategic frameworks identify common goals and objectives, milestones and benchmarks, and the broad processes through which they should be pursued, coordinated and integrated.

For an overall peacebuilding strategy to be a meaningful vehicle for system-wide coherence, it needs to be transparent, readily available to all agents, open for input

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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a visible agent for refugees and displaced persons as part of the peacebuilding system.

ACHIEVING A BALANCED AND MEANINGFUL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PEACEBUILDING AGENTS IS THUS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SUCCESS FACTORS FOR ANY POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING SYSTEM. IT IS ALSO ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE

and consultation, and regularly revised and updated. It is also critical that the overall effect of the strategy be closely monitored. If every peacebuilding agency has access to the strategic framework, and information related to the effect it is having on the peace process, they would be able to use this information to inform and adjust their own strategic processes and implementation planning.

Without a clear country strategy, and without feedback on the progress made in achieving that strategy, individual agents are unable to position, adjust and monitor the degree to which they may be making a contribution to the achievement of the overall peacebuilding goal. The process of developing and adjusting a common country strategic framework, and continuously sharing this information with all the agents in the system, thus acquires a critical role in the complex peacebuilding systems approach. The degree to which such a strategic planning system is currently absent goes a long way in explaining the lack of coherence evident in past and present peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction systems.

The Need to Ensure the Primacy of Internal Actors in the Peacebuilding System

There is wide recognition that externally-driven post-conflict peacebuilding processes are unsustainable.²⁵ Peacebuilding activities must be needs-based, and priorities such as sequencing and pace of delivery need to be informed by the dynamics of the conflict system, through local ownership and meaningful internal and external coordination. It is also widely understood that peacebuilding activities that are not grounded in the socio-cultural belief systems that shape the worldview of the internal actors cause dysfunction. Achieving a balanced and meaningful partnership between internal and external peacebuilding agents is thus one of the most important success factors for any post-conflict peacebuilding system. It is also one of the most difficult to achieve.

The principle that peacebuilding systems should be locally owned and led is well established in the policy realm. For instance, the February 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonization has generated the following four principles of harmonisation:

- 1 recipient countries coordinate development assistance;
- 2 donors align their aid with recipient countries' priorities and systems;
- 3 donors streamline aid delivery; and
- 4 donors adopt policies, procedures and incentives that foster harmonisation.²⁶

However, this is easier said than done, and external actors have reported that they have encountered a number of obstacles when trying to implement policies that encourage local ownership, especially in fragile states and post-conflict contexts. External actors find it difficult to identify credible internal actors with whom they can enter into a meaningful partnership, especially in the stabilisation and transitional phases before elections are held. This is because the parties emerging out of conflict typically represent ambiguous constituencies, and there are often conflicting claims of ownership and support. The internal actors also typically lack the time, resources, technical expertise and support systems to engage meaningfully with the external actors. In fact, the concept of fragile states was initially developed in the donor context to refer to countries where the government is unable or unwilling to establish meaningful relationships with bilateral and multilateral donors.

Internal peacebuilding agents report that they typically feel intimidated by the momentum, scope and depth of the external intervention. They are overwhelmed by the pressure to engage with all the assessments, proposals and plans generated by the sudden influx of external actors. They feel that the external actors fail to develop the capacity to engage meaningfully with them at a level, and in a paradigm, that is intelligible for the internal actors. Instead, internal actors are expected to develop the capacity to engage with the external actors in their paradigm. Whilst this is especially the case in the stabilisation and transitional phases, before or whilst the necessary capacities have been developed, it remains a problem long thereafter.

External actors also point to the dysfunction caused by their own institutional cultures, which emphasise outputs rather than impact. The pressure to respond rapidly, achieve planned outputs and to disburse funds within fixed time frames (external budget cycles) often results in external actors compromising on the time



Effective peacebuilding systems must operationalise the principle of local ownership.

and resources needed to invest in identifying credible internal counterparts, generate consultative processes and develop meaningful local ownership. Consultations undertaken under pressure, for instance during rapid needs assessments, often serve to legitimise preconceived perceptions rather than add value by generating independent and objective opinions and analysis, and thus fail to reflect the true needs and priorities of the internal actors. Under pressure from the internal and external power imbalance, internal actor representatives make the common mistake of telling the external actors what they think the external agents would like to hear.

This article highlights two areas within the internal-external tension that have the potential to transform the inherent tensions in this relationship. The first is the need to establish a rights-based approach that recognises that the internal actors have the human right to determine their own future. Meaningful sustainability requires that the internal actors should not just own the problem, but also the solutions. This rights-based approach implies that there should be processes in place, controlled by the internal actors, that generate the needs-based information needed to assess, design, plan, coordinate and implement assistance programmes. Where such processes are not in place, the external actors should invest

in facilitating them. Whilst external partners can assist such processes, they need to be locally owned and have meaningful power. This will be particularly challenging in post-conflict environments and fragile states, and both internal and external agents will need to invest considerable resources to developing processes and mechanisms that can generate meaningful local ownership. Without it, however, any investments made in peacebuilding systems are unlikely to be sustainable.

The second area is ensuring that the combined and cumulative effect of the assistance offered has a positive effect on the internal actors, and that it is delivered at a rate that can be absorbed. If the ultimate aim of the post-conflict reconstruction system is sustainable peace and development, then the overall strategy and the pace of its implementation should reflect the optimal balance between delivery and absorption. The legacy of violent conflict typically results in the internal actors having a much lower capacity to absorb assistance than the external actors anticipate. Post-conflict peacebuilding activities are typically planned at the outset, as intense short- to medium-term interventions and the bulk of the money theoretically available for these activities are made available in the early phases of the transition. Although well intended, the result is that large amounts

of money are spent on activities that the internal actors simply cannot absorb.

There is a need to synchronise the rate of delivery with the rate of absorption. In general, this translates into programming those elements of the assistance package that are not aimed at emergency relief and early recovery over a longer term, and directing more of the earlier assistance to building the capacities that would be required to absorb downstream assistance. Internal actors will be best placed to absorb assistance towards the end of the transitional period, when some basic capacities have been restored or newly established, and in the consolidation phase, when a newly-elected government is in place that has the constitutional legitimacy to determine national priorities. This does not imply that a few select short-term high-impact projects can not be pursued. However, the overall short- to medium-term high-impact approach currently favoured is not conducive to sustainable post-conflict peacebuilding, and ultimately results in higher costs to both the internal and external actors.

Conclusion

This article analysed the coherence and coordination dilemma in peacebuilding systems, with the objective of generating findings and recommendations that can encourage initiatives that will improve coherence and coordination in international and regional peacebuilding systems. One of the reasons why coherence has proven elusive is because the agencies that undertake peacebuilding activities lack a shared understanding of the role of coherence and coordination in peacebuilding systems. This article suggests that there is a core logic for coherence in peacebuilding systems, namely that all peacebuilding agents are interdependent in that they cannot achieve the goal of the overall peacebuilding system – addressing the root causes of the conflict and laying the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace and development – individually. In this context, the role of coherence and coordination is to manage the interdependencies that bind the peacebuilding system together.

The article emphasised two areas where the lack of coherence has had the most damaging effect on achieving sustainability and which, correspondingly, holds the most promise for improving peacebuilding coherence, once addressed. The first was the need to generate a clearly articulated overall peacebuilding strategy that can provide the various peacebuilding agents with a common frame of reference for coherence. It is impossible to achieve coherence if the framework, with which individual agents have to be coherent, is missing. There is a need to monitor the effect of the overall peacebuilding strategy on the host system on an

ongoing basis. This is necessary so that the strategy can be continuously adjusted to the dynamic environment, and so that the individual peacebuilding agents can independently make course directions to their own activities and, in so doing, contribute to the synchronisation of the overall peacebuilding system.

The second was the need to operationalise the primacy of the principle of local ownership. The inability of the external actors to give meaning to their stated policies and principles of alignment is one of the most significant shortcomings in the context of peacebuilding coherence. This article argues that meaningful local ownership can be achieved if the principle – that internal actors have the right to determine their own future – is accepted and operationalised. It also argues that the rate of delivery (by external actors) has to be synchronised with the rate of absorption (by internal actors). It will require considerable political will and focused attention to adjust these two parameters, but without meaningfully addressing these shortcomings, peacebuilding systems will continue to suffer from poor rates of sustainability and success. 📌

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
Endnotes

- 1 Espen Barth Eide, presentation delivered at the DDR from a Peacebuilding Perspective Course, 19-24 January 2004, Norwegian Defence International Center (NODEFIC).
- 2 Uvin, Peter (2002) 'The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms' in *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 5.
- 3 (2005) 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All (2005)', Paper of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Available at <www.un.org/largerfreedom>, and (2006) 'Delivering as One', Paper of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on System-wide Coherence, United Nations: New York. Available at <www.un.org/events/panel>.
- 4 The UN distinguishes between preventative peacebuilding and post-conflict peacebuilding. This paper is focused on post-conflict peacebuilding.
- 5 Intervention in this context is not meant to imply the use of force, but is rather used in the broad sense to refer to taking action aimed at bringing about change.
- 6 'Activities' is used throughout this article as an umbrella term for policies, programmes, projects and all other related actions taken by peacebuilding agents to pursue their respective objectives. It is defined by the OECD as 'action taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilised to produce specific outputs'. See OECD (2002) *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, Paris: OECD, p. 15.

- 7 There are a number of different interpretations of these phases, but most convey the same essential progression. See, for instance, the Association of the US Army & Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2002) *Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Task Framework*, Washington DC, in which they identify three stages, namely the initial response, transformation and fostering sustainability. For a more detailed explanation of the three stages referred to, see de Coning, C.H. 'Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations' in Langholtz, H., Kondoch, B. & Wells, A. (eds.) (2007) *International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations*, Volume 11, 2007, Koninklijke Brill N.V.: Brussels.
- 8 Internal actors are all local actors in the country or conflict system where peacebuilding activities take place.
- 9 External actors are all international actors engaged in undertaking peacebuilding activities in a given country or conflict system.
- 10 There is broad consensus on these dimensions. See, for instance, the African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework (2006) that comprises of six indicative elements, including gender as a self-standing element. The UN Secretary-General's Note on Integrated Missions lists seven dimensions, namely political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security. Note that humanitarian assistance is included as one of the peacebuilding dimensions in the UN Integrated Mission concept. The Utstein Report (2004) and NEPAD's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa (2005) include humanitarian assistance as part of the socio-economic development category. Many in the humanitarian community argue that humanitarian assistance falls outside the scope of peacebuilding, and should not be included in any such peacebuilding categorisation. See, for instance, Weir, E.A. (2006) 'Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative', KAIPTC Monograph No. 4, May 2006. The humanitarian dimension is included as one of the peacebuilding dimensions throughout this paper as per the UN concept, but with due regard for the principle of the independence of humanitarian action, as recognised in paragraph 10 of the Note on Integrated Missions.
- 11 This definition was initially developed by the author and Senzo Ngubane in 'Peacebuilding in Southern Africa', an ACCORD paper commissioned by JICA in 2004, and was further elaborated by the author in 'A Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa', a draft policy framework facilitated by ACCORD for NEPAD, published in May 2005. For a thorough overview and discussion of peacebuilding definitions, see Barnett, Michael; Kim, Hunjoon; O'Donnell, Madalene & Sitea, Laura (2007) 'Peacebuilding: What is in a Name?' in *Global Governance*, Vol. 13, No. 1, January – March 2007, pp. 35-58.
- 12 See (2003) 'Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development' in OECD Observer, Available at <www.oecd.org>. Accessed on 10 May 2007.
- 13 Amongst others: Dahrendorf, N. (2003) *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*, King's College: London; Porter, T. (2002) *An External Review of the CAP*, OCHA: New York; Sommers, Marc (2000) 'The Dynamics of Coordination', Occasional Paper No. 40, Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute of International Affairs, Brown University: Providence; Stockton, N. (2002) *Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan*, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU): Kabul; Donini, A. (2002) 'The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda', Occasional Paper No. 22, Thomas J. Watson Jr Institute for International Studies, Brown University: Providence; Reindorp, N. & Wiles, P. (2001) 'Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience', study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Overseas Development Institute (ODI): London; and Duffield, M., Lautze S. & Jones, B. (1998) *Strategic Humanitarian Coordination in the Great Lakes Region 1996-1997*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): New York.
- 14 See Picciotto, Robert (2005) *Fostering Development in a Global Economy: A Whole of Government Perspective, Introduction: Key Concepts, Central Issues*, OECD: Paris, pp. 13-14, where he identifies: (1) internal coherence, (2) whole of government coherence, (3) donor coherence and (4) country-level coherence.
- 15 Consistency in this context is not necessarily ethical, i.e. doing like under like circumstances with respect to any one rule or norm, i.e. avoiding double standards. Instead it refers to one agency, government, or system working at cross-purposes with itself in a more general sense. This does not imply that there is no room for differences and debate during the policy formulation and review process, but once a policy or intervention has been agreed on, it needs to be implemented in such a way that all the different elements of the agency, government or system contribute to the overall objective in a complementary fashion. I am grateful to Ramesh Thakur (The Centre for International Governance Innovation) for pointing out this difference (e-mail correspondence, 15 May 2007).
- 16 Note, for instance, the Canadian approach aimed at combining Diplomacy, Defence and Development, the so-called '3D' approach.
- 17 Note the Rome Declaration on Harmonization of 25 February 2003. Available at <www.aidharmonization.org>. Accessed on 12 May 2007.
- 18 Note, in this context, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2 March 2005. Available at <www.oecd.org>. Accessed on 12 May 2007.
- 19 For alternative definitions, see for instance 'Policy Coherence: Vital for Global Development', (endnote 12), that defines policy coherence as "...the systematic promotion of mutual reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the agreed objectives."
- 20 Cilliers, P. (2002) "Why We Cannot Know Complex Things Completely", *Emergence*, 4 (1/2), pp. 77-84.
- 21 Aoi, Chiyuki, de Coning, Cedric & Thakur, Ramesh (eds.) (2007) *The Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*, United Nations University Press: Tokyo.
- 22 Minear, L. & Chellia, U. (1992) *UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis*, Providence: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, p. 3.
- 23 Smuts, J.C. (1926) *Holism and Evolution*, N&S Press (1987 edition), Cape Town, p. 78.
- 24 As listed in endnote 13.
- 25 See *Building Effective Partnerships: Improving the Relationship between Internal and External Actors in Post-Conflict Countries*, Peacebuilding Forum Conference, 7 October 2004, New York, p. 2.
- 26 Rome Declaration on Harmonization, endnote 17.

BOOK REVIEW

REVIEWED BY **GEOFF HARRIS**



UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Editors **Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur**
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Things do not always turn out the way you plan, and the unexpected often happens. This book examines the unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations (PKOs) – some of which were reasonably expectable, and some of which were not.

Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations contains 11 chapters arranged in four sections, with introductory and concluding chapters by the editors. The first section reports on the unintended consequences of PKOs for women; the second and third sections examine the impact of PKOs on the host economies and troop-contributing countries respectively; and the final section considers issues of accountability and the extent to which unintended consequences can be prevented or managed. The introductory chapter notes that there were ‘three unwritten chapters’ – on Aids, corruption and the United Nation’s (UN) response to various unintended consequences.

The less than respectful treatment of women in host countries by peacekeepers has been a major issue since the UN report on peacekeepers and humanitarian workers in the Democratic Republic of Congo in early 2005, although there had been an earlier damning report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Save the Children United Kingdom on Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2002. The chapter by Kent documents this sad recent history, while Koyama and Myrntinen cover some of the same ground from a detailed study of PKOs in the former East Timor.

One of Kent’s recommendations (p. 55) is that women should comprise a larger percentage of peacekeeping forces. There is an awareness that men are responsible for almost all the direct violence in the world (peace guru Johan Galtung has suggested 95%, but regards this as an underestimation), and there is an obvious policy for the UN to adopt: to insist that peacekeeping contingents comprise a significant proportion of women. It is worth noting that one of the most successful PKOs of recent times – in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea – was characterised by high proportions of women and civilians in the peacekeeping team.

PKOs may contribute to spreading HIV/AIDS, either as a result of peacekeepers infecting local communities or, in areas of high prevalence of the virus, being infected themselves. One of the few studies on this issue found a direct relationship between the length of PKO service away from home by Nigerian troops and their HIV status (p. 142).

Moving from the gender-related effects, there are a ‘medley of unintended consequences’ for troop-contributing countries, including non-transparency in the procurement of equipment for PKOs (p. 138) and corrupt practices of various kinds (p. 144). Such negative unforeseen consequences need to be weighed against the earning of hard currency, the experience gained by personnel (although it is often argued that the attitudes and behaviour required for PKOs are quite different from those needed in a fighting force) and the status accruing to countries providing peacekeepers.

It is predictable that groups of young men – trained and strong in the belief that violence is the way to resolve issues, with time on their hands and away from home – are likely to behave badly (in some form) towards the local population. Unintended, yes, but somewhat predictable all the same. The book's final section examines the crucial question of making such peacekeepers more accountable. Hampson and Kahiri-Hunt review who is responsible for the criminal behaviour or breaches of codes of conduct by personnel (not only the military) associated with PKOs. Hoffman reviews the work of a possible 'beacon of light' – the ombudsperson institution in Kosovo.

The editors, in the final chapter, identify two major constraints on building accountability – authority (to whom is the PKO accountable?) and control (who is in charge on the ground?). This issue deserved much more than the two pages devoted to it in the book.

Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations is a readable and stimulating book, and the chapters flow together considerably better than in most edited books. By identifying various unintended consequences, the excuse for not anticipating them loses much strength. It deserves recommendation to students and others concerned with making PKOs more humane and effective. 📖

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Women should comprise a larger percentage of peacekeeping forces. The United Nation's first all-female peacekeeping force is a step in this direction.

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